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Abstract
What was the impact of military conflict on economic inequality? This paper presents new
evidence about the relationship between military conflicts and economic inequality in prein-
dustrial Germany, between 1400 and 1800. I argue that ordinary military conflicts increased
economic inequality. Warfare raised the financial needs of towns in preindustrial times, leading
to more resource extraction from the population. This resource extraction happened via inegal-
itarian channels, such as regressive taxation. The Thirty Years’ War was an exception to that
pattern but not the rule. To test this argument a novel panel dataset is constructed combining
information about economic inequality in 72 localities and 687 conflicts over four centuries. The
analysis suggests that there existed two countervailing effects of conflicts on inequality: destruc-
tion and extraction. The Thirty Years’ War was indeed a “Great Leveller” (Scheidel 2017), but
the many ordinary conflicts – paradigmatic of life in the preindustrial world – were continuous
reinforcers of economic inequality.
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1 Introduction
It has become a historic truism that wars are, as Scheidel (2017) argues, a “Great Leveller”.
Whether this negative relationship between war and economic inequality is due to the destruction
of capital, demographic decline, the confiscation of wealth of the rich, plundering, state collapse or
decline of trade and commerce, this empirical regularity is thought to hold throughout history (see
also van Zanden 1995, Piketty 2014: 147, Cosgel and Erene 2012: 321, Milanovic 2016: 56).
This paper examines the accuracy of the “war reduces inequality”-hypothesis for wars in the prein-
dustrial period. Specifically, it argues that most ordinary conflicts between major political author-
ities in the preindustrial era actually increased economic inequality. The response to the threat
of war induced political authorities to extract economic resources via inegalitarian channels, such
as regressive taxation. The Holy Roman Empire – Germany, for short1 – is the ideal testing
ground for this question as this was the area where the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) mostly took
place. Moreover, the Holy Roman Empire was a very diverse entity in economic, geographical and
institutional terms, and I will account for its diversity.
To test this hypothesis the paper employs novel data on the distribution of wealth at the household-
level in 72 cities and villages, collected from new archival tax records and secondary sources. The
data on wealth inequality are combined with information about 687 battles and sieges between
important political actors to examine conflict and inequality in Germany 1400 to 1800. Consistent
with the literature, my first econometric strategy exploits the plausibly exogenous occurrence of
battle action from the perspective of an individual town, and I account for potential omitted variable
bias and reverse causality. I then move to a difference-in-differences research design to establish a
more robust causal relationship between the two variables in question. I combine this quantitative
analysis with a historical account of what actually happened in towns that experienced warfare in
preindustrial Germany.
I find a strong and positive relationship running from warfare to economic inequality. During or-
dinary conflicts wealth was transferred from the lower and middle classes of society to the rich.
As a consequence, economic inequality increased. This strong statistical relationship is also eco-
nomically relevant. Specifically, a one-standard deviation increase in conflict exposure is associated
with an increase in the Gini coefficient by 15 percent of a standard deviation. This result is robust
to several checks. Moreover, the result is supported by the difference-in-differences estimates. A
back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that warfare might explain almost three fourths of the
inequality increase in Germany during the century that preceded the outbreak of the Thirty Years’
War. Yet the positive conflict-inequality relationship found during ordinary wars was significantly
different from what is found during the time of the Thirty Years’ War. That war was the exception
and not the rule, simply because it was exceptionally destructive in several ways and lasted for
thirty years.
1The geographical area this paper is interested in, is the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, and more
precisely its inner part that was subject to the imperial constitution (see Whaley 2012: 25-39). Geographically
this area corresponds roughly to modern Germany and Austria. As a shorthand, I will refer to this area either as
“Germany” or “the Empire”.
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My seemingly puzzling empirical results are due to there being two countervailing effects of conflicts
on inequality: destruction and extraction. The risk of being attacked during a war increased the
demand for protection. It induced local political authorities to draw revenue from the population
to build walls and arsenals, finance armaments, pay for mercenaries and create a bureaucracy to
extract resources. Since ordinary conflicts caused a locally very limited destruction, the indirect
extractive effect of warfare was likely larger than the direct destructive effect throughout most of
the period under study.
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. Empirically, it questions a long-running
assumption undergirding the relationship between warfare and inequality. The expansion of markets
and the economy (Puga and Trefler 2014: 755, van Bavel 2016, van Zanden 1995), demographic
growth (Alfani and Ryckbosch 2016, Pfister 2020), exclusive political institutions (Boix 2003, Scheve
and Stasavage 2017, Minns et al. 2020: 603), and cultural norms and ideology have been proposed
as major causes of preindustrial inequality growth (Alesina and Giuliano 2010, Basten and Betz
2013, Piketty 2020). Traditionally, warfare has been considered a factor that reduced economic
inequality (see Milanovic 2016: 56, Scheidel 2017: 86-112, 130-173). Instead, the findings of this
study suggest that warfare was an important factor that contributed positively to the preindustrial
inequality rise, a development that saw rising inequality across Europe long before industrialisation
began (see Alfani 2020). In other words, warfare might be a significant part of the explanation for
why economic inequality was high already when industrialisation was about to start.
Secondly, it also provides a plausible account of why warfare – arguably a defining characteristic of
preindustrial life (Pinker 2011; see also Tilly 1992: 72) – might increase inequality. The argument
is probably closest to Alfani and Di Tullio (2019, Alfani 2015, 2020), who argue that the way that
polities in preindustrial Europe taxed their subjects increased economic inequality, and to Ogilvie
(2019: 7, 173, 576) and Acemoglu et al. (2005: 390, Acemoglu and Robinson 2012: 157) who
emphasise that extractive institutions in general made the distribution of economic resources more
unequal.
Finally, the paper also extends the literature on the nexus between warfare, state formation and
fiscal capacity (Tilly 1975, O’Brien 1988, Ertman 1997, Volckart 2000a, Stasavage 2011, Dincecco
and Prado 2012, Gennaioli and Voth 2014). I suggest that warfare not only increased fiscal capacity
and stimulated the formation of economically beneficial, property rights-protecting states. When
political elites reacted to the risk of warfare with resource extraction, they also made preindustrial
communities more unequal.
The next section outlines the conceptual framework of this paper and provides historical background
information. Section three describes the data on economic inequality and military conflicts in
preindustrial Germany. Section four presents the empirical strategy and the main results of the
paper. Section five and six investigate the robustness of these results. Section seven concludes.
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2 Conceptual Framework
Economic inequality is an issue of topical importance because it has several socio-economic conse-
quences. It relates to the distribution of political power, has the potential for destabilising the social
balance and can have a direct detrimental effect on the economy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012:
343-344, Puga and Trefler 2014, Persson and Tabellini 1994, Atkinson 2015: 12). Moreover, recent
research has shown that economic inequality in Europe had been growing for centuries already
before the beginning of the industrial era (Alfani 2020), which has traditionally been considered
the starting point for substantially growing inequality (Kuznets 1955, Ray 1998: 209-211. Yet little
is known about why inequality reached high levels already before industrialisation began. This
section presents a framework that aims to explain how military conflicts are positively related to
economic inequality in preindustrial times.
In preindustrial Germany there existed three types of conflicts. First, there were feuds, which were
a small form of conflict, usually fought among two opposing individuals, such as knights, merchants
or peasants (see Volckart 2004a, Kroener 2013: 60).2 Secondly, there were bottom-up revolts by
peasants or townsmen (see Blickle 2012: 3-44). Thirdly, there were conflicts between important
political actors - analogous to ”interstate wars” in modern times - such as imperial estates and
authorities of comparable or higher rank like the King of France, Swiss Cantons or Italian states.3
This paper is interested in the third category of conflicts because these were more likely to be
exogenous events from the perspective of an individual locality. Focusing the analysis on conflicts
between important political actors makes it possible to identify the effect of conflicts on inequality
more precisely. The focus is thus on conflicts that were entirely different from those civil wars that
have been analysed in studies interested in the contribution of inequality to the outbreak of social
conflict (see Esteban and Ray 1999, Blattman and Miguel 2010, Baten and Mumme 2013).
Previous scholarship has predominantly emphasised a negative relationship between conflicts and
economic inequality, based on evidence from the world wars and, in the early modern period,
from the Thirty Years’ War. Often, the destructiveness of wars - widely defined, including factors
such as human loss, destruction of capital, confiscation and economic breakdown - is considered a
decisive driver behind inequality reduction (see van Zanden 1995, Piketty 2014: 147, Cosgel and
Erene 2012: 321, Milanovic 2016: 56, Scheidel 2017: 86-112, 130-173). However, the literature
has been silent about the impact of the frequent, less destructive conflicts that were typical of the
preindustrial era and that did not reach the dimensions of the Thirty Years’ War. Only recently
Alfani and Di Tullio (2019, Alfani 2015, 2020) have argued that inequality in preindustrial Italy was
driven by ”the rise of the fiscal state”, and that this rise was related to the ”Military Revolution”.
This paper continues that line of thought. It argues that in addition to the destructive effect
much of the literature has focused on, wars had a second, countervailing effect on inequality:
2Note that feuds were legally banned by the emperor in 1495. However, some feuds also took place in the early
modern period (Volckart 2004a: 287).
3Imperial estates were those political authorities that represented their polities (territories and imperial cities)
at the Reichstag (imperial diet) and that contributed to the costs of the Empire, such as the financing of the
Reichskammergericht (Imperial Chamber Court). See Oestreich and Holzer (1973) for an overview of the imperial
estates. For the time before 1422, when the first catalogue of imperial estates was compiled, the study focuses on
those political authorities that would later become imperial estates.
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inegalitarian extraction. Extraction happened because maintaining peace and providing protection
for inhabitants were fundamental tasks of communities in preindustrial Germany. The channels
through which communities extracted the necessary resources – taxation, credit, financially strong
organisations – benefited the rich to the detriment of the poor, increasing inequality. The extractive
effect of conflict exposure is schematically summarised in Figure 1.
Risk of exposure to ordinary
preindustrial military conflict








Figure 1: Extractive effect of warfare on economic inequality
During most of the period under study, the extractive effect was presumably larger and so wars
constantly increased economic inequality. Importantly, the Thirty Years’ War was an exception to
that pattern. It was exceptionally destructive, more than any other war in early-modern Europe.
Therefore, during the Thirty Years’ War the destructive effect prevailed relative to the extractive
one, making this war an exceptional leveller. Yet declining inequality in the aftermath of conflicts
was not the rule.
After elaborating on the hypothesised mechanisms that link military conflicts to economic inequal-
ity, some alternative explanations for the increase in economic inequality in premodern societies
are discussed.
2.1 Historical Background: Extraction, Destruction and Inequality
It is a well-established fact that warfare increased political elites’ need to extract financial resources
in preindustrial times (see O’Brien 1988, Karaman and Pamuk 2013). Following the same logic,
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the extractive effect of warfare on inequality was a consequence of exposure to military conflicts
that increased the financial needs of communities. This resource need derived from the fact that
maintaining peace and providing protection for inhabitants were fundamental tasks of towns in
preindustrial times. The period was characterised by the absence of monopolies of force in the
hands of consolidated ‘Weberian’ states (Volckart 2000a: 279, 2002b: 25). The wish to protect
the own existence, but also trade, manufacturing activity and political independence made defence
infrastructure indispensable (Isenmann 2014: 448-452). Exposure to a conflict did not necessarily
mean being actually attacked. It was the risk of being attacked during a war that was decisive for
increasing a town’s demand for protection. The capacity to protect inhabitants gave preindustrial
towns a “safe harbour” character (Glaeser and Shapiro 2002: 208-210, Dincecco and Onorato 2016:
260). This protective task of towns was only made redundant with the widespread dismantling of
walls and fortifications in the nineteenth century (see Heil 2003: 113-116).
Incidents of warfare in the surrounding area increased the risk for towns of being attacked. This risk
increased the demand for protection. It made the extended use of costly defence and bureaucratic
infrastructure (e.g. more wardens, more weapons and more warriors) and its permanent expansion
necessary (e.g. more fortification, bigger arsenals, institutionalization of defence management, more
legislation, expansion of the fiscal administration).
This expansion of defence and bureaucratic infrastructure was further promoted by constant inno-
vations in military technology across Europe, making the military sector the most dynamic one of
the preindustrial economy (Hoffman 2011: 41, 55). Between the fourteenth and the eighteenth cen-
turies decisive innovations happened, beginning with the replacement of knights with mercenaries,
innovations in artillery, subsequent improvements in fortification, the “gun powder revolution”, the
increasing size of armies and finally the professionalisation of armies. The more military technology
advanced, the more costly it became for communities to adapt to it (Kroener 2013: 62, 69, Fouquet
1989: 59).
The evolution of military technology made existing defence infrastructure obsolete in case of attack.4
As a response, walls and gates became stronger over the centuries, equipped with more towers,
wards, several rings of additional walls and earthworks (Landwehren).5 For example, in Nuremberg
the fortification was reinforced from 1384, shortly after the War of the Swabian League (1376-
1377) and in expectation of an upcoming war between princes and cities, which eventually came
about with the War of the Cities (1387-1394). Then, in response to the Hussite Wars (1419-1434),
Nuremberg reinforced its town moat. In 1452, just after the First Margrave War (1449-1450), a
second city wall was built, including the installation of cannons at every gate. The improvements of
4Traditional weapons, such as the crossbow were not very powerful and had a short reach so that effective defence
ideally happened from above, requiring high but not particularly strong walls. The appearance of handguns and
cannons in the fourteenth century implied two changes for a town’s defence. First, in order to keep enemies at a
longer distance the defence line of towns was moved outward. Effective defence did not happen anymore from above
but rather at a long distance. Second, the switch from stone to iron bullets used in canons increased the effectiveness
of cannons so that towns had to upgrade their fortifications and moats (Isenmann 2014: 103, 457). In the seventeenth
century the early-modern Military Revolution is generally believed to have accelerated in Germany (Burkhardt 1992:
213-219).
5Landwehren were planted earth walls, sometimes with additional towers at some distance around a town. These
could be very large systems, such as the 120-kilometre-long Landwehr of Schwäbisch Hall (Isenmann 2014: 103).
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wall and moat were quite elaborate, requiring a workforce of around 800 men. Further improvements
of the fortifications were undertaken until well into the seventeenth century, to keep up with the
technical and tactical improvements in artillery (Isenmann 2014: 100-102). Similarly, Hamburg
enhanced its fortification in the style of the trace italienne in the seventeenth century because of
continuous conflict with the Danish King, and Freiburg im Breisgau reinforced its fortification in
1744 because of the threat of being attacked by French troops during the Austrian War of Succession
(1740-1748) (Weber 2000, Rödel 2003, Hohrath 1996: 323).
Smaller towns reacted in similar ways to exposure to warfare and the risk of being attacked. For
example, during the Saxon Fratricidal War (1446-1451) the council of the small town Altenburg
ordered to expand the defence infrastructure, although the town was not even directly involved
in the conflict. The town built a bulwark, strengthened the town wall and enhanced the moat.
Around 70 people participated in the construction works, which was a significant amount in a town
of about 600 households at the time (Löbe, 1895, pp. 166–168).6 Similar developments took place
in villages, which, just like towns, had a desire for and took measures to achieve protection and
security. Villages had simple defence constructions such as walls and palisades and were clearly
able to defend themselves against modest military attacks (Rösener 1996: 98, Blickle 1981: 52-53,
Bonney 2002: 75).7 However, overall the continuous updating of defence-related construction was
quite an uneven process across towns in premodern Germany. Some towns still had wooden walls
as late as the sixteenth century when others already had sophisticated fortification (Isenmann 2014:
102). The variation in defence infrastructure was to a good extent determined by the intensity of
warfare in preindustrial Germany (Dincecco and Onorato 2016: 278-279).
Beyond fortification, warfare induced towns to acquire expensive arms and equipment, expand their
storage facilities and professionalise the management of arms and equipment. Since the fifteenth
century the increasing number of armed people, the standardisation of arming, its procurement, and
new weapons such as cannons made new storage facilities necessary. A town-level administration
for procuring, repairing and storing arms and equipment developed. Among other things, expanded
armour chambers (arsenals), or stables for horses employed in defence were built (Isenmann 2014:
456). For example Überlingen reacted to the threats of the Swabian War (1499) with the acquisition
of new canons, followed by the construction of a new arsenal for storing these and other weapons
(Koberg 1975: 62-64). Needless to say that the acquisition of weapons and the building of storage
facilities required towns to spend large sums (Isenmann 2014: 454).
In addition to construction activity, exposure to warfare also made it necessary for towns to expand
their defence infrastructure in terms of personnel and deploy more people, often in squads of guards
(Schützenkorps). This was necessary not just to fend off actual attacks, or participate in a battle,
but also because of the general insecurity created by roving mercenaries during war periods.8
6Figure calculated based on population figures provided in the Deutsches Städtebuch, assuming an average house-
hold size of 4.5 people.
7Between the High Middle Ages and the end of the early modern period 35 to 43 percent of very small communities
(with less than 1,000 inhabitants) had actual walls in Germany (Tracy 2000: 84).
8Standing armies became increasingly important and gradually replaced mercenaries from the second half of the
seventeenth century. However, in the eighteenth century only eight out of more than 300 imperial estates actually
had standing armies (Schmidt 2009: 37).
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These warriors had a high potential for violence, especially when they were laid off after fighting
and plundered the surrounding area to make a living (Kroener 2013: 14, 59, Krüger 1980: 3). In
risky times of war, therefore, the number of guards had to be augmented, to staff all parts of a
town’s fortification, for providing safe conduct, for policing and dealing with robbers. For example,
Altenburg first doubled and later quadrupled its number of guards during the Saxon Fratricidal
War. Moreover, the town sent soldiers – equipped by the town with weapons, horses and provisions
– to support the troops of the elector of Saxony in the nearby battle action (Löbe 1895: 166-167).
Over time the services of professional mercenaries for protective purposes became more widely used,
replacing the military services of laymen. Since mercenaries were quite costly the costs of defence
for towns in war times inevitably increased (Kroener 2013: 13, 25).9
With the increasing importance of defence infrastructures grew the local bureaucracy (Isenmann
2014: 457). This happened, first, in order to put in place security legislation.10 Second, the bu-
reaucracy managed defence. Towns hired – often highly paid – specialists for procuring, using,
repairing and storing weapons (Büchsenmeister, Zeugwart), hired defence construction special-
ists (Festungsbaumeister), established supply managers (Proviantmeister) and formed special war
councils (Kriegsrat) in the town administration to manage the risk of and response to threats
(Isenmann 2014: 454-456, Schmidtchen 1985: 287-289). For example, following the building of its
new arsenal after the Swabian War, Überlingen prepared its first weapon inventory and attempted
to hire a particularly skilled gunpowder producer from Nuremberg as weapon master in its new
arsenal (Koberg 1975: 62-64). Thirdly, to extract the necessary resources to pay for protection,
towns expanded their fiscal administration. However, that was labour-intensive and expensive in
itself, because town officials earned high wages (Schilling 1994: 66, Isenmann 2014: 457). For
example, in early eighteenth-century Göttingen a new consumption tax was introduced to cover
the costs of warfare. The administrative effort of this new tax increased the costs of the municipal
tax administration about fourfold, to ca. 11 percent of the gross tax revenues (Winnige 1996: 80).
It comes as no surprise that towns in premodern Germany have been considered the “hothouse of
the modern bureaucratic state”, and also at this lower level of political organisation it seems true
that “War made the state” (see Isenmann 2014: 449, Tilly 1975: 2).
Apart from defence and bureaucratic infrastructure, there were additional expensive efforts that
communities had to make in times of warfare. For example, they had to provide board and lodging
for soldiers fighting nearby,11 or ransom imprisoned inhabitants as part of the community’s pro-
9Originally towns relied on militias consisting of townsmen for their numerous protective tasks, but already in the
fourteenth century approximately a third of armed forces consisted of mercenaries (Kroener 2013: 3). Mercenaries
were very costly, but they were preferable to untrained laymen, because they could hold out better against growing
armies and because military service and invalidity of townsmen were a considerable disruption to a town’s economy
(Isenmann 2014: 453).
10Communities introduced so called “police ordinances” (Polizey Ordnungen). These should not be confounded
with the modern notion of police. In preindustrial Germany these ordinances regulated social life of communities in
order to maintain public and private security in a wide sense. They regulated, among other things, clothing, poor
relief, prices, guild rights, but also indicated how to deal with criminal activity of vagrants, robbers, bandits and
marauding soldiers (Härter 2010: 44-46, 52).
11Again, during the Saxon Fratricidal War the small town Altenburg accommodated 370 man and 180 horses, and
deployed 20 cooks for providing them with meals. Given this effort – for construction, personnel and accommodating
soldiers – it comes as no surprise that Altenburg had to raise specific war taxes (Löbe 1895: 166-167).
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tective task.12 In sum, warfare was a huge challenge for towns, in terms of effort and economic
resources needed. This resource need increased constantly with the technological progress in de-
fence technology during premodern times. The abrupt increase of the resources needed in times of
war – to cover defence, bureaucracy and other war-related costs – could become a ruinous burden
for a community’s budget (Isenmann 2014: 452-453).
In order to obtain the financial means to cover the costs of protection towns had to extract economic
resources from their inhabitants and from the surrounding area.13 Local political authorities had
several options to obtain the resources they needed. Presumably the most important channel to
extract resources was taxation (Fouquet 1989: 71-74, Becker et al. 2018). There were many different
taxes that could be levied and they fall in three main categories: consumption taxes (e.g. Ungeld,
Akzise), wealth taxes (e.g. Schoss, Geschoss, Bede, Schatzung, Ordinari Steuer) or extraordinary
war taxes (e.g. Nürnberger Hussitensteuer, Augsburger Zuschlagssteuer). The fact that towns in
premodern Germany extracted more economic resources from their inhabitants because of warfare
is historically well documented. For example, Konstanz tripled its wealth tax to cover the costs of
the Old Zurich War (1439-1450) (Kirchgässner 1960: 89), Hamburg levied a special tax to pay for
the conflict with the Prince of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel in 1554 (Potthoff 1911: 19-20, 43-46) and
Straubing levied a war tax to pay for the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) (Keim 1957:
67).
Additionally, territorial rulers’ requests sometimes increased the local resource burden. From the
end of the seventeenth century rulers of the largest territories within Germany started building up
defence infrastructure.14 When rulers were powerful enough they, for example, could impose the
construction of a fortress on a community. Inhabitants typically had to bear the brunt of the costs
(Kroener 2013: 39-43, Hohrath 1996: 308, Rödel 2003: 98, 103).15 For example, the reinforcement
of the fortification in Freiburg during the War of the Austrian Succession was ordered by the
territorial ruler, but townsmen had to pay a daily poll tax to cover the costs (Hohrath 1996:
321-323).
12For example, Frankfurt paid the huge sum of 73,000 gulden to ransom 620 people during the War of the Cities
(Isenmann 2014: 147).
13In Germany towns had a particularly high degree of administrative and fiscal autonomy from their de jure
overlords, compared to the rest of preindustrial Europe. At the beginning of the early modern period this applied
to the circa 85 imperial cities and territorial towns alike (Schilling and Ehrenpreis 2015: 38-40). Yet for territorial
towns the growth of territorial states implied an increasing interference in the local administrative autonomy by
their overlords. Since most territories could not establish themselves in terms of fiscal- and military-administration
until the end of the early modern period, communities maintained considerable administrative autonomy in terms
of defence and taxation (Schilling 1994: 21, Volckart 2002c: 163-165, Schilling and Ehrenpreis 2015: 28-29, 37).
Maintaining peace and providing protection for inhabitants remained a fundamental interest of German towns in the
early modern period (Schilling and Ehrenpreis 2015: 46; see also Wiese-Schorn 1976: 30).
14This expansion of territorial military infrastructure did not apply to many territories. Schmidt (1999: 37) only
counts eight imperial estates (out of more than 300) that had standing armies of a size worth mentioning at the
beginning of the eighteenth-century. But still, in those territories where this process began, extracting resources from
the population was needed to cover the costs of defence infrastructure (Kroener 2013: 44).
15An additional form of resource extraction that came along with standing armies was billeting. Under that system
the civilian population was forced to accommodate soldiers, provide them with basic goods, such as wood, lighting
and salt, or make money payments for maintaining the army. This practice was inequality-promoting, because local
elites were often exempt from the duty of accommodating or paying for soldiers (Eichberg 1989: 108-109). Moreover,
payments in kind were effectively inegalitarian poll-taxes.
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Political elites did not only tax their own inhabitants to extract resources for warfare. Typically,
towns taxed the villages that surrounded them as well (Isenmann 2014: 454-455), and also villages
themselves levied taxes on their inhabitants (Volckart 2004b: 27).16 For example, after the costly
expansion of Altenburg’s town moat during the Saxon Fratricidal War, the town levied a special
war tax on the peasants of the surrounding villages (Löbe 1895: 167).
Another frequently used mode to finance war-related expenses was the expansion of credit. For
example, to cover the costs of the Neuss War (1473-1480), Cologne borrowed more in two years
than it had borrowed in the previous half century (Stasavage 2011: 113). However, credit only
postponed resource extraction via taxation, because interest had to be paid and eventually the
credit had to be paid back (Fouquet 1989: 74). Debt was such an important means of finance that
towns earmarked 60 percent and more of their revenues for servicing debt in the late early modern
period (Chilosi et al. 2018: 639-640).
A final possibility of towns to extract resources in order to pay for warfare was through collaboration
with financially strong organisations. Ecclesiastical organisations, such as monasteries, contributed
to the resource need caused by warfare, either in kind (e.g. giving horses, wagons) or money
(Isenmann 2014: 454). Yet another source of towns’ revenues were corporate groups, such as
guilds. Since guild masters often were among the richest individuals in their towns, they were
important financiers in case of a military conflict (Laufer 1973: 179-189, Ogilvie 2019: 52-54,
576). Moreover, guilds had considerable coercive means at their disposition (Volckart 2002a: 330).
Political authorities, therefore, received military services (e.g. guarding, fighting, organizing the
militia) and loans from guilds, which were valuable contributions in times of warfare (Isenmann
2014: 451-454).
Why is this relevant for economic inequality? The channels through which towns obtained the nec-
essary economic resources to cover the costs of protection - credit, financially strong organisations,
taxation – had potentially inegalitarian effects.
The inegalitarian impact of credit derived from who had to bear the burden of repayment and
interest, and who benefited from it. Usually, the creditors were local elites, that is, rich individuals
like merchants, guild masters or officials. Warfare increased the demand for credit. Since interest
rates were commonly quite high at the time - between ten and three percent (see Chilosi et al. 2018:
647) - rich individuals could accumulate even more wealth due to warfare (Alfani and Di Tullio 2019:
172-173, Schulze 1995: 271, Stasavage 2011: 116). Poor people could not make such profitable
investments in public debt because their saving capacity was very low (Dirlmeier 1978: 517).17
Instead, they could expect to be subject to rising regressive taxes in order to pay for the debt
(Stasavage 2011: 116-117). Towns in the Empire had strong incentives to service their debt (Chilosi
et al. 2018: 643-664), thus reinforcing the inegalitarian dynamic.
16Towns received taxes from villages either in return for offering protection in so-called “peace federations”
(Landfriedensverband), or for granting economic privileges (e.g. toll exemptions), or because the town was an
administrative-protective centre for villages within a larger territory (Isenmann 2014: 672-673, 679-688)
17Chilosi et al. (2018: 651-653) find that the average sum creditors invested in public debt even increased from the
fourteenth to the eighteenth century, from 31 annual “respectable consumption baskets” to 87 . In a poor preindustrial
society (see Broadberry et al. 2015: 423), these figures imply that it must have been rich individuals that invested
the bulk of capital and profited from the high interest rates paid for government debt.
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Obtaining economic resources from financially strong organisations had inegalitarian effects too.
Ecclesiastical organisations extracted economic resources in ways that were quite similar to the
taxing practices of secular authorities. The standard ecclesiastical contribution - the tithe (Zehnt)
- was a flat tax, and also other contributions (for example Hufengroschen, Häuslergroschen) were
either proportional or poll taxes with regressive effects, just like taxes levied by secular authorities
(Borgolte 2004: 52, Blaschke 1989: 63, 69).
The redistributive effect of guilds stemmed from the fact that they provided economic resources
in case of warfare to political authorities, in return for receiving privileges that gave guilds mar-
ket power. These privileges typically comprised the granting of monopolies, control of prices and
wages, subsidies, tariffs, entry restrictions, labour market regulations or other legislative favours
(Ogilvie 1992: 432-433, Volckart 2002a: 330). Such collaboration between guilds and local political
authorities was very common in preindustrial Germany (see Ogilvie 2019: 531, Wahl 2019: 202).
Naturally, granting guilds the right to redistribute parts of the economic pie to themselves poten-
tially exacerbated economic inequality (Acemoglu et al. 2011: 3288-3289, Ogilvie 2019: 7, 173,
576).
Possibly the most important redistributive channel of warfare was taxation. Premodern tax systems
functioned very differently compared to their modern counterparts. In modern times, progressive
taxation in the aftermath of warfare is considered a crucial leveler of inequality (Scheve and Stasav-
age 2016). Instead, premodern tax systems were structurally regressive, which means that “the
poor were taxed proportionally more than the rich” and hence “post-tax inequality was higher
than pre-tax inequality” (Alfani and Di Tullio 2019: 147). This characterisation also applied to
taxing practices in preindustrial German communities (Scott 2002: 45), and the three major tax
types employed for extracting resources for warfare. The first type were wealth taxes. These were
usually proportional taxes, levied by applying a flat tax rate, that is, asking the same percentage of
wealth or income from rich and poor. For example, in 1420 Frankfurt the tax rate was 7 percent,
in 1530 Rostock 10 percent and 3.5 percent in 1676 Nördlingen (Bücher 1917: 417, Staude 1912:
154, Friedrichs 1979: 158). Modern notions of progressive taxation did not exist.18 The regressive
character was exacerbated by partial tax exemptions, for privileged, presumably wealthy groups
and organisations. This could be the case, depending on the local context, for the property of
nobles, the church and of other elite individuals, such as officials (see Alfani et al. 2020: 67-68).
The second tax type – consumption or excise taxes, levied on basic consumption goods – was
potentially even more regressive. They have been labelled “the most unsocial tax imaginable”
(Boelcke 1971: 171). The reason for this lies in Engel’s law: taxes on basic consumption goods,
such as beer or grain, weighed particularly heavily on the budgets of the poorer strata of society
because they spent a larger part of their household budgets on such basic goods compared to rich
people (Winnige 1996: 81, Alfani and Di Tullio 2019: 149-150). Such taxes were substantial,
increasing the price of goods such as bread or beverages by 10 to 30 percent. Given that urban
middle class households spent approximately 70 percent of their budget on foodstuffs, taxation
could be a heavy burden on them (Isenmann 2014: 525, Dirlmeier 1978: 420).
18It has been shown that the tax system in Germany was regressive until at least 1871 (Buggeln 2019: 79-81, 511).
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The third tax type that communities used to extract resources in times of war was potentially the
most regressive one (Isenmann 1999: 268): extraordinary war taxes, often levied as poll- or semi-
poll tax, that is, either setting a fixed amount for every member of a certain profession or setting
a high basic amount for everybody. Poll taxes were highly regressive because by asking everybody
to pay the same amount, they effectively took an increasing share of income or wealth the poorer
the taxpayer was (Isenmann 2014: 521). Yet these taxes were appealing to authorities because by
levying the same amount on everybody, poll taxes required low administrative effort. A poll tax
was for example levied in Damme in 1602 because of the nearby Dutch War of Independence (1568-
1648) (Imsiecke et al. 2010: 91-131), in Straubing during the War of the Spanish Succession (Keim
1957: 67), or in Freiburg during the War of the Austrian Succession (Hohrath 1996: 321-323).
In sum, the more economic resources political elites extracted through the described channels,
the more unequal the society became. However, the inegalitarian effect of resource extraction was
typically intensified on the spending side. In modern, industrialised societies the provision of welfare
makes up approximately two thirds of government budgets. In preindustrial societies things were
radically different (Alfani and Di Tullio 2019: 165-167). Social spending was a marginal part of
a town-government’s budget. The bulk was spent for construction, personnel and equipment for
defence, bureaucracy, the service of debt, or was lost in the form of rents from officeholding. A
town government in preindustrial Germany typically spent around 6 to 8 percent for bureaucracy,
9 to 19 percent for construction (which was mostly defence-related), 29 to 41 percent for security
and external affairs, 31 to 67 percent for paying for debt and interest, and only 0 to 2 percent for
welfare, such as health and poor relief (Isenmann 2014: 519-521). This spending pattern favoured
members of the socio-economic elite, such as military contractors, producers of military equipment,
merchants, officials and those wealthy enough to lend money to the government (Schulze 1995: 278;
see also Kroener 2013: 15). Consequently, spending could not counterbalance the inegalitarian effect
of resource extraction, but potentially exacerbated it.
For these reasons, when there was warfare and towns extracted resources to pay for defence, bu-
reaucratic infrastructures and the direct costs of war, economic inequality grew. There was a
redistribution of economic resources from relatively poor people to socio-economic elites.
Yet many studies suggest that wars actually reduce economic inequality, because of some form of
destructiveness, such as the demolition of physical capital, expropriation, or population decline
(Piketty 2014: 147, Cosgel and Erene 2012: 321, Milanovic 2016: 56, Scheidel 2017: 86-112, 130-
173). However, for late-medieval and early-modern times, the only war for which there is actual
evidence of a significant inequality reduction is the Thirty Years’ War (van Zanden 1995, Pfister
2020, Alfani et al. 2020). Indeed, there are at least four theoretical reasons that suggest that
economic inequality could have declined during the Thirty Years’ War: demolition of physical
capital, expropriation and plundering, contraction of trade and commerce, and population decline.
First, due to battle action and troop movement large quantities of physical capital were destroyed.
This included buildings, cropland, tools or other assets relevant for production. The damage to
livestock was particularly pronounced, with losses of more than 90 percent in some regions. This
destruction of physical capital potentially hit harder rich individuals who had lots of capital to lose
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(van Zanden 1995: 646, Wilson 2009: 783-806, Schmidt 2018: 624).
Secondly, the war brought about large-scale expropriation and plundering (Asch 1997: 158). To
cover their costs, armies extorted immense sums from occupied provinces or towns, threatening
the population to burn down localities, plunder and apply crude force if they did not pay. The
demanded amounts frequently went into the 100,000s of florin or thalers within weeks. Additionally,
soldiers often plundered their surrounding areas. In contrast to resource extraction during ordinary
wars, also the rich were expropriated in these ad hoc actions, as famously happened in Augsburg
(Asch 1997: 152, 158, 177-178, Redlich 1959: 247-250, 254, Scheidel 2017: 339). Moreover, political
authorities imposed “haircuts” on their creditors – another form of expropriation – and refused to
pay interest during the war. This brought huge losses for the rich (Press 1991: 250, Scheidel 2017:
338, Schmidt 2018: 632).
Thirdly, the war led to a decline of trade and commerce, due to inflation, the loss of commercial
ties, a lack of transport animals and widespread insecurity. Many businesses failed (Röck 1989:
941, Asch 1997: 156, Wilson 2009: 795-801). This potentially hit producers with high market
quotas and wealthy merchants particularly hard (Röck 1989: 943, Schmidt 2018: 632).
The three named factors most likely had egalitarian consequences. However, these factors also inter-
acted and entailed important spill-over effects, which shaped the overall economic and distributive
impact of the Thirty Years’ War. Physical destruction of capital goods, extortions, plundering,
and the reduction of trade and commerce triggered an economic crisis of production, especially in
agriculture.19 This was made worse by harvest failures in 1635/36 (Outram 2001: 162). A slump
in agricultural production brought food scarcity and famine, which in turn was excellent breeding
ground for the return of plague between 1632 and 1640. Soldiers roving throughout Germany helped
to diffuse the plague (Press 1991: 250, Asch 1997: 178-179). Famine and plague led, fourthly, to
an enormous decline of the German population – of about 40 percent – that went far beyond the
immediate impact of battle action (Outram 2001: 152-153, Wilson 2009: 790-792). Demographic
decline possibly reduced inequality through two channels: first, it raised the land available per
person, reduced the price of agricultural produce and real estate, increased marginal productivity
of labour and thus the income of labour.20 Second, death was socially selective. Poor people were
more likely to suffer from famine and plague and had a higher probability of dying (Pfister 2020:
303-9, 318, Scheidel 2017: 335, Asch 1997: 180, Outram 2001: 165). This curtailed the share of
poor people in the wealth distribution, which mechanically reduced inequality.
All the named factors have potentially egalitarian effects and it is, therefore, no surprise that the
Thirty Years’ War led to a reduction in inequality. The inequality-decline seems almost overex-
plained. However, the decisive point for the history of inequality is that the Thirty Years’ War
was an exceptionally destructive event, proportionally even more destructive than the two world
19For example, in 1633 Bamberg, the loss of draught animals, which were an essential capital good in agriculture,
left the peasants to pull their own ploughs by hand. This had obvious negative consequences for productivity and
food production (Wilson 2009: 801).
20Note that the egalitarian effect of a reduction of prices for agricultural goods is the result of poorer households
spending a relatively larger share of their household budget on foodstuffs and fuels. If prices decline, as after the
Thirty Years’ War, purchasing power of the poor improves (Pfister 2020: 307-309). This enables the poor to buy, for
example, real estate and experience upward social mobility.
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Table 1: Wars in Germany and their casualties
Date War Casualties Casualties p.a.
1377-1389 Swabian League of Cities War 3,250 250
1385-1388 Sempach War 175 44
1419-1434 Hussite Wars 23,400 1,463
1462 Bavarian War 2,000 2,000
1522-1523 Knight’s Revolt 2,000 1,000
1524-1525 Peasant’s War 145,000 72,500
1546-1547 Schmalkaldic War 8,000 4,000
1569-1583 Münster Rebellion 6,000 400
1618-1648 Thirty Years’ War 8,000,000 258,065
1688-1697 Palatine War of Succession 580,000 58,000
1701-1714 War of Spanish Succession 1,205,000 86,071
1733-1735 War of Polish Succession 85,000 28,333
1740-1748 War of Austrian Succession 330,270 36,697
1756-1763 Seven Years’ War 988,000 123,500
1778-1779 War of Bavarian Succession 300 150
1792-1797 War of First Coalition 330,800 55,133
1798-1801 War of Second Coalition 444,270 111,068
Notes: Data from Brecke (1999). Casualties p.a. indicate the average number of deaths
per year of the respective war.
wars and definitely more destructive than any other war in early-modern Europe (Wilson 2009:
787 Ogilvie 1992: 439).21 It does not represent the historical norm. This exceptionality of the
Thirty Years’ War can be seen clearly in the extraordinarily high number of people that were killed
during the war compared with all other preindustrial wars for which data are currently available
(see Table 1).
However, egalitarian destruction was only one of two countervailing effects of preindustrial conflicts
on inequality, the other one being inegalitarian extraction. This is why the Thirty Years’ War
contrasts with ordinary premodern conflicts. The destruction caused by ordinary conflicts was
relatively small (see Table 1) because geographically more limited, that is, without the spill-over
effects that were characteristic of the Thirty Years’ War.
Yet ordinary conflicts were quite extractive for the wider population, as described above. Through-
out most of the period under study this extractive effect of conflicts was most likely the dominant
one. Consequently, ordinary conflicts increased economic inequality, and the Thirty Years’ War
reduced it.
Case study evidence for the existence of these two countervailing effects comes from early modern
Augsburg. Traditionally, scholars have employed the case of Augsburg to exemplify the inequality
decline triggered by the Thirty Years’ War (van Zanden 1995: 647, Scheidel 2017: 337). However,
21There has been a controversial debate among historians about how destructive the Thirty Years’ War actually
was. The first author to support statistically the hypothesis of a highly destructive Thirty Years’ War was Franz
(1961). His figures have subsequently been heavily criticized as exaggerated, ideologically biased and methodologically
flawed. However, recent studies agree that Franz’ main conclusion of a relatively destructive Thirty Years’ War that
killed approximately 40 percent of the German population, are, notwithstanding some methodological shortcomings,
ultimately probably correct (Outram 2001, Wilson 2009: 790-792).
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Figure 2: Inequality and conflicts in early-modern Augsburg
Notes: Own calculations based on data from Hartung (1898). Gini coefficients clustered
around reference years. Red lines indicate years in which Augsburg was exposed to conflicts.
The red box marks the time of the Thirty Years’ War.
as can be seen from Figure 2, Augsburg was exposed to other conflicts during the early modern
period: to battles that were part of the Swabian War, the War of the Succession of Landshut, the
German Peasant’s War, the Schmalkaldic War, the Franco-Dutch War and the War of the Spanish
Succession.
Indeed, contrary to what happened during the Thirty Years’ War, after all conflicts, inequality
in Augsburg increased. This suggests that the relationship that ran from conflict exposure to
inequality was not generally negative or positive. Most likely, there were two countervailing effects:
egalitarian destruction dominated during the Thirty Years’ War, and inegalitarian extraction during
ordinary conflicts.
2.2 A Simple Model of Wealth Accumulation During Warfare
To fix ideas, the countervailing effects of warfare on economic inequality can be analysed through
a simple non-structural model of capital accumulation. We are interested in the development of
wealth (or capitalised income) K between two periods t and t+ 1:
Kt → Kt+1.
Without warfare the accumulation process of K can be described as the following function:
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Kt+1 = [S + (1 + r)× (1− δ)×Kt]. (1)
S are total savings (where S = s × Y , s being the savings rate and Y income), r is the interest
rate and δ the rate of depreciation. For simplicity we assume that everybody in the population
has access to the same interest rate. We differentiate between the wealth of high-wealth holders
KH and low-wealth holders KL, and their corresponding savings rates are SH and SL. Wealth
accumulation in peace times can therefore be characterised as
KH,t+1 = [SH + (1 + r)× (1− δ)×Kt] (2)
and
KL,t+1 = [SL + (1 + r)× (1− δ)×Kt]. (3)
Warfare introduces two additional parameters in the process. First, the risk of being involved in a
war increased the demand for protection of communities. Political authorities extracted economic
resources in order to fulfil that protective task. er is the extraction rate by which capital K is
reduced. However, a characteristic feature of resource extraction in preindustrial communities,
and in particular of taxation, was its regressive character. For example, the reliance of authorities
on wealth taxes with flat rates and exemptions for the rich, on consumption taxes that weighed
heavier on poorer households, or on poll taxes that effectively asked a higher share of income or
wealth the poorer the household, hit the poor strata much harder than the rich (Boelcke 1971: 171,
Isenmann 2014: 521, Alfani and Di Tullio 2019). For example, the increase of the tax on beverages
in Augsburg to cover the costs of the Schmalkaldic War in 1547, clearly hit the poor harder than
the rich. This was the result of the poor typically spending a higher share of their household
budget on basic consumption goods (see Roth 1928: 372, Dirlmeier 1978: 420). Moreover, rich
individuals probably benefited disproportionately in the form of higher capital accumulation from
the war-time expansion of credit at high interest rates. We differentiate therefore again between
high-wealth holders KH and low-wealth holders KL, and to both groups apply different extraction
rates erL > erH .
Secondly, military conflicts also caused destruction and many scholars have emphasised the impor-
tance of war-related destruction for explaining phases of inequality decline (see van Zanden 1995,
Cosgel and Erene 2012: 321, Piketty 2014: 147, Milanovic 2016: 56, Scheidel 2017: 86-112, 130-
173). Destruction reduced wealth through a multitude of factors, such as the demolition of capital,
expropriation and plundering or economic decline: w represents the share of wealth that is reduced
because of destruction. Historically, destruction was locally quite limited for ordinary conflicts, but
much more pronounced during the Thirty Years’ War. Poor strata of the population experienced
comparatively less wealth reduction due to destruction. They simply had less capital goods that
could be demolished or plundered than rich people, and potentially even benefited from increased
mortality that brought about lower prices for foodstuffs and real estate, and higher wages due to
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the scarcity of labour (van Zanden 1995: 646, Scheidel 2017: 335 Pfister 2020: 303-309). Moreover,
if a war became so immensely expensive that governments defaulted on their debt - as happened
for example during the Thirty Years’ War - then the rich lost substantial parts of the money they
typically lent to governments (Schmidt 2018: 632). In other words, while extraction was regressive,
destruction was progressive. We differentiate therefore again between high- and low-wealth holders
and assume wH > wL.
In sum, model parameters that change due to a military conflict are the extraction rate er and the
destruction rate w. Through simple re-arrangement we can derive a function of wealth accumulation
for high- and low-wealth owners during warfare:
KH,t+1 = (1− erH)× (1− wH)× [SH + (1 + r)× (1− δ)×Kt] (4)
and
KL,t+1 = (1− erL)× (1− wH)× [SL + (1 + r)× (1− δ)×Kt]. (5)
If we assume that all variables in the square brackets are fixed during warfare, then Equations 4
and 5 suggest that after a military conflict in t + 1 the change in wealth possessed by high- and
low-wealth holders depended on the magnitudes of the extraction rates (erH and erL) and the rates
of destruction (wH and wL). These parameters determined the wealth differentials between rich
and poor caused by warfare, and therefore wealth inequality.
Equations 4 and 5 also suggest that depending on whether the conflict was small or large, either
the effect of extraction or destruction prevailed. Low-destruction conflicts had a relatively higher
er but a relatively lower w, and vice versa. This implies that in high-destruction conflicts w could
offset the extractive effect of er.
These predictions can be simulated by plugging in reasonable values for the parameters of the
model. For simplicity I assume that the population consists only of two groups, rich and poor, and
I define the top 20 percent of the population as rich and all others as poor.22
The part of the model written in square brackets is the fixed part of the wealth accumulation
process, which is assumed to be unaffected by warfare. As values for initial capital KH,t and KH,t I
assume that rich households have on average eight times more wealth than poor households, which
corresponds approximately to what has been found in recent studies (see Schaff 2020).
The measure of inequality is the ratio between the average wealth share between rich and poor
households:
KH/KL.
This is a simple inequality indicator in the spirit of “Kuznets-shares” (see also Piketty 2020: 530).
22This definition is based on the observation that only the two top deciles of the population owned a consistently
higher wealth share relative to their population share in preindustrial Germany (see Schaff 2020).
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Since rich households have on average eight times the wealth of poor households, the initial in-
equality value is eight.
I assume that the interest rate was five percent, which corresponds approximately to the nominal
interest rates on annuities found by Chilosi et al. (2018: 647) for the bulk of cases in late medieval
and early modern Germany. The depreciation rate is set to zero because it does not change the
dynamics we are interested in.
It is difficult to come up with precise estimates of income and savings rates for rich and poor parts
of the population. Yet it is reasonable to assume that poor people had a lower savings rate than
rich people, even in preindustrial times. The higher budget surplus of the rich could have been
the result of a lower share of available income spent for consumption purposes or because rich
had to pay fewer contributions (Alfani and Di Tullio 2019: 154-155). Yet it is at best possible to
approximate roughly how much lower the savings rate of the poor in preindustrial Germany was.23
I have made the conservative assumption that the poor saved on average one fourth less than the
rich and for simplicity I assume that savings are one percent of a rich household’s capital stock.24
These parameters determine wealth accumulation in peace time.
The parameters that change wealth accumulation during wars are the extraction rate er and the
rate of destruction w. It is again difficult to come up with absolute extraction and destruction rates,
but to highlight the countervailing effects of the two factors it suffices to make an assumption about
their relative importance. I assume that the extraction rate for rich people is half the extraction
experienced by poor people, and that the destruction rate for the poor is half the destruction
rate of the rich. Note that although these might seem arbitrary values, the direction of inequality
development remains the same regardless of the actual values, as long as the extraction rate remains
higher for poor people and the destruction rate remains higher for rich people.
Figure 3 shows how these assumptions affect the development of wealth inequality in a simple
simulation. Three scenarios of inequality development have been simulated: peace time, a war
where extraction dominates and a war where destruction dominates. Note that the peace-time
scenario could also be interpreted as a war in which extraction and destruction exactly offset each
other.
The simulation covers three periods of 25 years each. During each period the parameters take the
same values. In the first period, there is no warfare and therefore neither extraction nor destruction
result from conflict. Wealth accumulation and inequality move into the same direction in all three
scenarios. Note that the increase of inequality is the result of the differential savings rates of rich
23Dirlmeier (1978: 517) shows that poor people too saved some money. Instead, the figures of Chilosi et al. (2018:
653) suggest that most investments in public annuities were actually made by wealthy individuals,and one might
be tempted to assume based on their figures that the savings rate of the poor was practically zero. However, the
definition of the poor in the simplified model is very wide: “poor” was who belonged to the bottom 80 percent of
the population and the top 20 percent are defined as “the rich”. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the poor,
as defined in the model, had a savings rate that was on average smaller than those of the rich (SH > SL), but
nevertheless positive.
24Note that the amount that rich households saved in relation to their income was probably much larger than what
they saved in relation to their capital stock. However, for keeping the model simple, I calculate savings in relation to
already accumulated capital. See Alfani and Di Tullio (2019: 152-165) for a similar approach.
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and poor households, which make the rich move apart.
Figure 3: Simulated Wealth Inequality during Warfare
In period two, warfare comes into play in scenarios two and three. The effects of warfare are
assumed to continue over the whole period. The peace-time scenario represents the counterfactual
inequality-development, a situation without warfare. It can be clearly seen that when a war is
comparatively more extractive than destructive, wealth inequality increases with respect to the
counterfactual situation. This scenario of the extractive effect being large enough to increase
wealth inequality represents the typical development during ordinary wars. Conversely, inequality
is reduced with respect to the counterfactual scenario and even declines in absolute terms when
the destructive effect is large enough to offset the extractive effect. The destructive-war scenario
can be seen as historically analogous to the development of inequality during the Thirty Years’
War in Germany. In the third period no warfare happens and inequality develops into the same
direction in all three scenarios. However, the inequality levels of the three scenarios differ because
the redistributive effect of warfare in the previous period has permanently changed the distribution
of wealth in scenarios two and three.
The main insight of this simple microeconomic model is that when the relative importance of
extraction and destruction shifts during warfare, so do inequality trends. This model is of course
highly stylised, and we are not going to test it as such. However, the econometric reduced-form
estimates presented below are in line with the predictions of the model. They suggest that ordinary
low-destruction conflicts had a relatively high extraction rate. This could exacerbate inequality,
but destruction could become so large that it offset the extractive effect.
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3 Data
Figure 4 provides an overview of the localities (yellow dots) for which inequality data is available
and the conflicts (red diamonds) that happened before, during and after the Thirty Years’ War.
They are the main parameters of the following analysis.
Figure 4: Spatial distribution of conflicts before, during and after the Thirty Years’ War
Notes: Localities included in the analysis depicted in yellow and conflicts depicted in red. The map on the left
shows conflicts that happened before the Thirty Years’ War (1375-1617). The map in the middle shows conflicts that
happened during the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648). The map on the right shows conflicts that happened after the
Thirty Years’ War (1649-1800). The maps show those localities that are included in the dataset during the respective
time periods. Borders of the inner and wider Holy Roman Empire around 1545 from Volckart (2020).
The main data for economic inequality come from a novel panel dataset (Schaff 2020; see also Alfani
et al. 2020). It contains data on the distribution of wealth and wealth inequality (expressed in Gini
coefficients, ranging between zero and one, in steps of 25 years) for rural and urban communities
within the borders of the inner part of the Holy Roman Empire (see Appendix for spatial and
temporal distribution of communities). The data are based on tax registers or from wealth lists
prepared to levy taxes. These were locally collected property taxes levied on households of citizens
and non-citizens. Subject to the limitation discussed below, such tax registers give a fairly accurate
picture of household-level wealth inequality in a locality. Similar sources have been used in other
studies on the long-term development of preindustrial economic inequality, in Germany and other
regions of Europe (Warde 2006, Alfani and Ryckbosch 2016, Alfani et al. 2020).
It should be noted that the data refer to the distribution of wealth (or capitalised income), while
in modern times income inequality is usually the object of interest (see Milanovic 2005). Wealth
inequality is interesting in itself, even in the industrial period (Saez and Zucman 2016, Scheve
and Stasavage 2017). Yet it is also the best, and usually the only proxy for income inequality in
preindustrial economies, where income mainly derived from land, since 80 to 90 percent of GDP
derived from the agricultural sector (Lindert 2014: 8, Alfani 2015: 1062).
The wealth distributions that this study uses are biased towards the middle. Parts of the very top
(such as nobles, clergy, officials and other privileged groups) of the distributions are sometimes but
not always missing because of tax exemptions. It is difficult to quantify the exclusions, but some
tentative approximations of the size of the excluded groups are possible. The nobility and clergy
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made up approximately 1.5 percent of the total population in the sixteenth century and 0.5 percent
in the first half of the nineteenth century (Saalfeld, 1980, p. 480). Most excluded households
were probably part of these groups, but not all members of clergy and nobility were excluded from
taxation.25 Note that propertyless households are included in this dataset. However, there were
more exemptions. For example, officials (who were occasionally part of the nobility as well) were
sometimes exempt.26 In consequence, I probably underestimate overall inequality. Moreover, the
missing parts of the distribution are likely to bias my estimates of the impact of conflict exposure
downwards. According to the conceptual framework, it should for example be highly paid town
magistrates that benefited from inegalitarian resource extraction during warfare. The fact that
these groups were sometimes missing from the wealth tax data probably leads me to underestimate
the true impact of conflicts on economic inequality. My estimates should therefore be considered
as being on the conservative side.
The dataset has a panel structure and includes 72 places for which at least two data points are
available. Over the whole period of interest – from 1400 to 1800 – the dataset contains 436
observations. This might seem a small number and the econometric analysis ahead is limited
by the current scarcity of observations. However, it is substantially more than those in recently
published studies of the determinants of inequality in the preindustrial period.27
The potential cause of inequality in which this paper is interested in are military conflicts, or
more precisely military conflicts in which at least one imperial estate or authorities of similar
rank participated. As explained above, these conflicts are more likely to be exogenous from the
perspective of an individual locality than for example bottom up revolts and make it easier to
identify the effect of conflicts on inequality. Still, there are obvious endogeneity concerns, which
will be addressed in the next section.
The relevant data for historical military conflicts come from several secondary source. The main
sources are Dincecco and Onorato (2018) and Jaques (2007). These have been complemented with
sources that cover more specifically the wider Holy Roman Empire (see for example Darby and
Fullard 1970, Schubert 2011, Glasauer 2017; see Huning and Wahl (2018) for a similar approach).
The dataset contains 687 conflicts (battles and sieges), making it the most comprehensive one
for preindustrial Germany. For all conflicts the year and the settlement closest to an individual
battle action were recorded, which made it possible to geo-reference them with high precision.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to measure more precisely the intensity of a conflict, for example
with the number of casualties. At the current state of research, the best systematic data available
tell us whether there was a conflict or not. It is likely that the dataset does not record all conflicts
– a general problem of studies of historical warfare, especially in the preindustrial period (Pinker
2011: 229) – but it is reasonable to assume that it includes the most important conflicts that
historical research has recorded. For example, for the Thirty Years’ War the dataset includes 83
25See Alfani et al. (2020) for a more detailed discussion of the sources.
26However, also in the case of officials there were exceptions to the exemptions. For example, in Augsburg the
Syndicus, one of the highest officials of the city, was not exempt from paying taxes on real estate (Hartung 1898:
169).
27Milanovic (2018) has 41 observations in his cross-country study of pre-modern societies.
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Figure 5: Economic inequality in German communities (aggregate Gini-change), c. 1400-1800
Notes: The trend line of Gini change has been obtained regressing an unbalanced panel of all
Gini coefficients for the period of study on a full set of locality fixed effects and year dummies
(reference year 1375). The coefficients on the year dummies represent aggregate Gini change
(for a detailed discussion of the aggregation method see Clark (2005: 1322-1323) and Alfani
et al. (2020: 82-84).
individual conflicts.
I have selected all conflicts from the dataset that fall within the wider Holy Roman Empire. This
means that besides the core regions of the Empire, Germany and Austria, conflicts from Bohemia,
the Low Countries and Switzerland, as well as from parts of Italy, France and Poland are considered.
These regions were part of, or associated with, the Empire at some point in their history. Given
the permeability of borders in the premodern era, it is reasonable to assume that a conflict, for
example near Bautzen in Lusatia, had an impact on nearby Saxonian towns.
Figure 6 shows the number of conflicts per quarter century. There are two major spikes in the graph:
the Thirty Years’ War in the seventeenth century and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic
Wars at the end of the eighteenth century (see Dincecco and Onorato 2016: 266 for a similar
pattern). The latter one comprises a seemingly exceptional number of conflicts but many of them
actually happened at the margins of the Holy Roman Empire, especially in the Low Countries,
Italy and Bohemia (see map above).
What do these figures tell us about bellicosity in preindustrial Germany? From the end of the fif-
teenth century onwards the Empire took measures to increase security and limit bellicosity (Schmidt
1999: 33).28 In fact, “promoting peace between its members [was] the Empire’s core function”
28Major measures of the Empire to increase security were the Ewige Landfrieden (Eternal Peace) of 1495 and the
ordinance concerning the implementation of imperial law (Reichsexekutionsordnung) of 1555. These imperial acts
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Figure 6: Number of conflicts per quarter-century, c. 1400-1800
Notes: The number of conflicts is counted over the period before each year t = 1400, 1425,
. . . , 1800. For example, conflicts that occurred from 1501 to 1525 count for the number of
conflicts in year 1525. The number of conflicts refers to all conflicts that were counted in this
period in the wider Holy Roman Empire.
(Chilosi et al. 2018: 665). Nonetheless, the numerous recorded conflicts in the late Middle Ages
and the early modern period suggest that the Empire has not been entirely effective in avoiding
conflicts and even less in shielding itself from foreign interference (Ogilvie 1996: 122, Rödel 2003:
99, 109, Kroener 2013: 21).
In line with previous research on the topic (see Besley and Reynal-Querol 2014, Dincecco and
Onorato 2016, 2018), I construct a dummy variable that equals one if there was at least one
conflict between two inequality measurement points within a distance of 150 kilometres from a
locality. This measure of conflict exposure of a locality is the main variable of interest in the
analysis.
Using a dummy variable as an indicator of conflict exposure has the advantage of reducing the
potential for error in the measurement of conflict frequency (Dincecco and Onorato 2016: 267).
However, in order to address concerns about the reliability of this simple measure, a robustness
check will be performed with alternative categorical variables that indicate whether a locality was
exposed to more than one conflict. Moreover, the distance of 150 kilometres has been chosen
empirically. 150 kilometres is approximately the threshold with the highest explanatory power. It
outlawed feuds among the nobility and the rest of the population, thus prohibiting the common man from using
the legitimate use of force and initiating a separation between state and society in the Empire. Moreover, it legally
banned conflicts between imperial estates. In the territories, the princes were responsible for the implementation of
the Landfrieden. Conflicts between imperial estates were referred to the Reichskammergericht (Imperial Chamber
Court), or, in case of large conflicts, to the Reichskreise (imperial circles) (Schulze 1986: 131-132, Schmidt 1999:
33-37, 104-105, Westphal 2018: 402-405).
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is roughly in line with the maximum distance between conflicts and localities employed in recent
studies.29
A natural question might be why a locality should have reacted to a conflict in a way that increased
inequality if it was not directly hit by the conflict. It should have reacted because the actual combat
operations were, as mentioned, by no means the only, or decisive, element of a conflict in relation to
economic inequality. What mattered for a locality was that it had to protect its inhabitants when
there was the risk of being attacked during a war (Glaeser and Shapiro 2002: 208-210, Dincecco and
Onorato 2016: 260). That risk made the extended use of defence and bureaucratic infrastructure,
and its permanent expansion necessary.
One might also ask whether the effect of a conflict on inequality nevertheless differed when a polity
was actually one of the belligerents. Unfortunately, at the current state of research, this question
is impossible to answer systematically. Often, a conflict party was composed of a union of several
polities and every one of these union members could have been in further alliances with other
polities, often smaller ones that did not have the capacity to maintain a sufficient number of armed
forces. They then paid a larger polity for protection (Schilling 1998: 122, 162), which implies that
conflict exposure to polity A might have increased the financial need of polity B, although B was
not formally involved in the conflict. Unfortunately, reconstructing all alliances for all belligerents
is simply beyond our current historical knowledge at such a geographical, temporal and systematic
scale, not to speak of information about victors and losers for every battle.30 Yet the analysis will
provide case-study evidence that suggests that being among the victors or losers of a war did not
have a significant impact on economic inequality.
Similarly, in conflicts that were part of a larger war, troop movements might have had effects
similar to an actual battle. Because of a lack of systematic data, troop movements, too, cannot be
considered. In substance, this analysis is limited to information about where and when a conflict
took place. Information about conflicts is only a proxy for the totality of militant events during a
war. However, it should be noted that when there was indirect exposure to militant events through
troop movements which my conflict data do not adequately capture, a locality would appear as
non-exposed while in reality it was exposed. This leads most likely to an underestimation of the
true effect of conflicts, but not to an overestimation.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Econometric Methodology
In this section I employ a two-way fixed effects panel estimator to measure the impact of conflict
exposure on economic inequality. I estimate variants of the following specification:
Ii,t = αi + πt + βCi,t−1 + γ
′Xi,t + εi,t (6)
29Dincecco and Onorato (2016, 2018) geographically sorted conflicts into rectangular grid cells of 150 × 150 kilo-
meters.
30See Scheidel (2017: 199) for the argument that premodern wars increased inequality among the victors and
reduced it among the losers.
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Ii,t is wealth inequality of locality i in year t (t = 1400, 1425,. . . until 1600 and from 1675
until 1800).31 The Gini coefficient is the main dependent variable, but also alternative inequality
measures are employed based on wealth percentiles, such as the wealth share of the top 5% or the
bottom 50% of the population. Unless otherwise indicated the results will refer to the period from
1400 to 1600 and from 1675 to 1800. The observations from 1625 and 1650, that is, those that fall
into the period of the Thirty Years’ War, are considered separately because a different relationship
between inequality and warfare is hypothesised during that period. Ci,t−1 is the measure of conflict
exposure that takes the value one if there was a military conflict within 150 kilometres of locality
i over the previous period.32 The threshold of 150 kilometres has been chosen empirically (see
below). αi are a full set of locality fixed effects and πt are time fixed effects (years). Xi,t is a
vector of locality-level controls (explained below). These are included in the robustness checks only
because the time-variant characteristics could be “bad controls” or collider variables (Angrist and
Pischke 2009: 64-68, Schneider 2020). Unobserved factors are captured with the random error
term εi,t. The standard errors are robust, clustered at the locality level in order to account for the
possibility of serial correlation in the error term. This is a more conservative approach compared to
similar studies where standard errors have instead been clustered at the regional level (see Dincecco
and Onorato 2016, Cantoni et al. 2018: 2085). In the Appendix some of the baseline results are
reported with spatial autocorrelation-adjusted standard errors, as discussed in Conley (1999).
4.2 Endogeneity Concerns
In order to address concerns about endogeneity, I account for potential omitted variable bias and
reverse causality through several strategies. The modelling approach accounts for unobserved
factors that might have an impact on the dependent and the independent variable of interest.
Locality fixed effects account for characteristics that are time-invariant and locality-specific. Several
of such characteristics have been considered relevant for explaining differences in inequality levels
between localities, such as inheritance institutions (Alfani 2015: 1077-1078, Wegge 2020, Bartels
et al. 2020), city status (Alfani and Ammannati 2017: 1097), land-tenure systems (Sokoloff and
Engerman 2000, Banerjee and Iyer 2005: 1197, Malinowski and van Zanden 2017: 378-379) or the
overarching social order of feudal societies (Piketty 2020).33 Time fixed effects account for shocks
that might have had an impact on inequality in all localities. For example, an important issue
might have been events at the imperial level, such as constitutional changes. Moreover, general
economic trends or a changing frequency of conflicts are captured by the time fixed effects.
To mitigate further omitted variable bias, I account for several observable characteristics that have
been considered alternative explanations for inequality change. I include two demographic vari-
31Inequality measures have been clustered around their closest reference year.
32In order to determine as precisely as possible whether a locality was treated or not in a period, I took as a cutoff
between periods the actual year of inequality measurement, not the clustered reference year.
33The basic social order in premodern Germany consisted of four different estates or groups: clergy, nobility,
burghers in towns and peasants. Belonging to these groups implied different legal privileges and obligations. For
example, one’s estate determined whether an individual was ruled or was a ruler himself, which profession one could
follow, whom one could marry and what one could consume. To which group an individual belonged was determined
by birth and generally fixed for lifetime. This legal inequality might have implied an underlying economic inequality
in premodern times (see Volckart 1998: 52, 74, Scott 2002: 27-55).
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ables, the log-population size of a locality and the occurrence of epidemics. It has been argued that
demographic expansion played an important role in determining preindustrial inequality growth,
and that vice versa population decline led to lower inequality (Alfani and Ryckbosch 2016: 32,
Pfister 2020).34 Moreover, the population size of a locality is a frequently used proxy for economic
development (see Dittmar 2011: 1136), which has often been considered an important driver of
inequality (Kuznets 1955, van Zanden 1995: 649, 656-658, Deaton 2015: 1-5). Additionally, con-
flict exposure might have increased the population in premodern towns because these were “safe
harbours” to which people migrated in case of warfare (Dincecco and Onorato 2016: 261-263).
This might have increased inequality because migrants were often relatively poor (Alfani 2015:
1089-1090). Importantly, such inequality growth as a result of conflict-induced migration could po-
tentially be an alternative mechanism to the one I propose. Finally, military conflicts often spread
epidemics, which had a straight-forward impact on the population size and possibly on inequality
(Alfani and Ammannati 2017: 1090, Alfani and Murphy 2017: 333-334, Alfani et al. 2020: 30-32).
I also include several institutional variables. A body of literature argues that more oligarchic, closed
or less participative forms of government promoted inequality compared to more participative, open
or republican institutions (Boix 2003, Ogilvie 2007: 662, Stasavage 2011: 111-117, Minns et al. 2020:
603). To account for this possibility I include a variable that indicates whether a community had a
participative government.35 Also, several studies have claimed that differences in culture or ideology
can explain inequality differences. Specifically, the introduction of the Protestant Reformation
might have had an impact on economic inequality, because of differences in how redistributive
Protestant and Catholic town governments were (Alesina and Giuliano 2010, Piketty 2020, Basten
and Betz 2013; see also Dittmar and Meisenzahl 2020: 6). I therefore include a variable that
indicates whether a community introduced the Protestant Reformation. I also include a variable
that indicates the log-distance of a town to its nearest university. Universities might have had
an impact on inequality for two reasons: first, higher human capital, created by universities but
to which only few selected individuals had access, might have increased economic inequality (see
van Zanden 1995: 658-661, Dittmar 2019). Secondly, universities provided political elites with the
trained officials that were needed to extract more resources from their subjects, which potentially
increased inequality (see Ogilvie 1992: 426, Ertman 1997: 224). Additionally, a variable is included
that indicates the log of the taxes a community’s imperial estate had to pay to the Empire. Since
imperial taxation is considered highly correlated with territorial taxation, this variable accounts for
the possibility that the demands for taxes of the Empire (e.g. for external defence) or of territorial
rulers could have increased inequality (see Schilling 1998: 118, 121, Schulze 1978: 256-261).
Ultimately I include several time-invariant geographic controls, all interacted with time-dummies.
Agricultural potential captures possible inequality growth due to productivity increases in agricul-
ture (Allen 1992: 283-302). A locality’s distance to a navigable river and seaside location proxy
34In agricultural societies with an inelastic supply of land a rise in population implied four things: first, greater
demand for agricultural produce leading to higher prices (which disproportionately increased food expenses for the
poor); second, a rise in rents for real estate; third a decline in wages, and fourth, “proletarianisation”, which concen-
trated land in the hands of large landowners. All these dynamics led to more poor people and the rich accumulating
more income and capital (Rodepeter 1998, Alfani and Ryckbosch 2016: 151, Pfister 2020).
35This variable is coded analogous to Wahl (2019). See the Appendix for details.
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for market access. This accounts for the possibility that inequality is attributable to the expansion
of markets and long-distance trade (van Zanden 1995: 652, Puga and Trefler 2014: 755, van Bavel
2016: 261-263).
Consistent with the literature (Karaman and Pamuk 2013, Dincecco and Onorato 2016, 2018), my
first econometric strategy exploits the plausibly exogenous occurrence of battle action from the
perspective of an individual town. This assumption is supported by the focus on military conflicts
in which important political actors participated, such as imperial estates (for example, the Duke
of Bavaria or the Elector of Brandenburg), the Holy Roman Emperor, the King of France, Swiss
Cantons or Italian states. In this way, those types of conflicts that might have been the outcome
of economic inequality (see Esteban and Ray 1999, Blattman and Miguel 2010, Baten and Mumme
2013) are generally excluded from the analysis.
Table 2 gives an overview of all wars that are part of the dataset and the main causes of these wars
that the historical literature has identified. It shows that the conflicts covered by the dataset most
likely broke out due to reasons that were unrelated to the variable this paper is mainly interested
in. Wars have been classified as plausibly exogenous from the perspective of an individual town,
as ambiguous, or as likely endogenous, depending on whether inequality was among the factors
that the historical literature considers relevant for explaining the outbreak of a war. Note that
classifying wars as endogenous or exogenous based on a qualitative assessment of their historical
reasons is similar to the “narrative approach” used in time-series econometrics to establish causal
effects (see Cloyne 2013, Alesina et al. 2015).
There were many different reasons for warfare to start. A number of wars broke out because of
disputes over the hereditary succession of a ruler, such as in Guelders, Spain, Poland or Austria.
Several conflicts broke out over the question of which was the “right” religious confession. Others
broke out because of a ruler’s quest for gaining territory, such as Louis XIV’s attempts to round
off the borders of France at the expense of the Low Countries and the Empire in the second part
of the seventeenth century.
Table 2: Wars and their causes
Date War Main Causes Plausibly
Exogenous
1351-1401 Florentine-Milanese Wars Sphere of influence (Jaques 2007: 918) YES
1369-1389 Caroline War (100-Years’
War)
Territorial gain (Wagner 2006) YES
1371-1379 1. Gueldarian Succession
War
Hereditary succession (Sternberg 2004:
111)
YES
1376-1377 War of the Swabian League Independence (Isenmann 2014: 322) YES
1386 Sempach War Independence, territorial gain (Marchal
1987)
YES
1387 Padua-Verona War Territorial gain (Rogers 2010) YES
1387-1389 War of the Cities Power balance, independence (Schubert
2011)
YES
1388-1389 Great Dortmund Feud Independence (Garnier 2001: 26) YES
1397 Battle of Kleverhamm Payment of levy (von Schaumburg 1861) YES
1400 Bergtheim War Independence (Leng 2012) YES
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Date War Main Causes Plausibly
Exogenous
1401-1429 Appenzell Wars Independence, payment of levy
(Burmeister 2001)
YES
1410-1413 Austrian War Strategic routes, territorial gain
(Brandstätter 2009)
YES
1415-1453 Lancastrian War (100-
Years’ War)
Hereditary succession (Wagner 2006) YES
1419-1434 Hussite Wars Confessional dispute (Moraw 1989: 372-
378)
YES
1420-1422 Great War of the Lords Territorial gain (Glasauer 2017) YES
1422 Arbedo War Territorial gain (Jaques 2007: 63) YES
1423-1444 2. Gueldarian Succession
War
Hereditary succession (Ferber 1863: 14-
15)
YES
1423-1454 Venetian-Milanese Wars Sphere of influence (Jaques 2007: 163) YES
1427 Mainz-Hesse War Sphere of influence, territorial gain (De-
mandt 1981: 196)
YES
1439-1450 Old Zurich War Hereditary succession (Illi 2015) YES
1444-1448 Soest Feud Territorial gain, independence (Heimann
2009)
YES
1446-1451 Saxon Fratricidal War Hereditary Succession (Löbe 1895: 157-
161)
YES
1447-1450 Milanese War of Succession Hereditary succession (Jaques 2007: 200) YES
1449-1450 1. Margrave War Territorial gain, revenues resource ex-
traction (Zeilinger 2015)
YES
1453-1474 Franco-Burgundian War Territorial gain (Jaques 2007: 385) YES
1459-1463 Bavarian War Sphere of influence (Seyboth 2014) YES
1460-1462 Baden-Palatine War Ecclesiastical succession (Sprenger 1999) YES
1465-1468 Straelen War Territorial gain (Heinrichs 1910: 78-87) YES
1473-1480 Neuss War Territorial gain (Schmitz 1895: 6-10) YES
1474-1477 Burgundian Wars Territorial gain, sphere of influence
(Sieber-Lehmann 2011)
YES
1477-1482 Burgundian War of Succes-
sion
Hereditary Succession (Hollegger 2005:
42-60)
YES
1477-1487 Austrian–Hungarian War Political alliance (Fessler 1867: 120) YES
1494-1498 Italian War of Charles
VIII.
Territorial gain, power balance (Alfani
2013: 13-16)
YES
1499 Swabian War Sphere of influence, strategic routes
(Niederstätter 2011)
YES
1503-1505 Landshut Succession War Hereditary succession (Schmidt 2004) YES
1508-1516 War of League of Cambrai Power balance (Clodfelter 2008: 8) YES
1519-1523 Hildesheim Diocesan Feud Territorial gain (Brüdermann 2000) YES
1522-1523 Knights’ Revolt Privilege restoration (Schilling 1994:
131)
YES





Hereditary succession (Schilling 1994:
224)
YES
1531 Second War of Kappel Confessional dispute (Clodfelter 2008:
12)
YES
1534-1535 Muenster Rebellion Confessional dispute, ecclesiastical con-
trol (Schilling 1994: 175)
YES




Date War Main Causes Plausibly
Exogenous
1543 3. Gueldarian Succession
War
Hereditary succession (Schilling 1994:
228)
YES
1546-1547 Schmalkaldic War Confessional dispute (Schilling 1994:
213, 229)
YES
1551-1559 Italian War of 1551-59 Territorial gain (Mallett and Shaw 2012:
252-254)
YES
1552-1554 2. Margrave War Territorial gain (Schilling 1994: 239) YES
1567 Grumbach Feud Imperial status (Schilling 1994: 246-247) YES





1568-1598 French Wars of Religion Confessional dispute (Clodfelter 2008:
12-13)
YES





Confessional dispute, territorial gain
(Schilling 1994: 414-415)
YES
1618-1639 Bündner Wirren (30-
Years’ War)





Confessional dispute, territorial gain
(Press 1991: 201-202)
YES
1628-1631 Mantuan Succession War
(30-Years’ War)
Hereditary succession, sphere of influ-
ence (Press 1991: 214)
YES
1630-1635 Swedish War (30-Years’
War)
Sphere of influence, territorial gain, po-
litical alliance (Press 1991: 218-220)
YES
1635-1648 Swedish-French War (30-
Years’ War)
Power balance, political alliance
(Schilling 1994: 447)
YES
1648-1659 Franco-Spanish War Power balance (Press 1991: 214, 387) YES
1652-1654 1. Dutch War Trade dispute (Press 1991: 390) YES
1653 Swiss Peasant War Economic crisis (Suter 2010) ?
1656 1. Villmergen War Confessional dispute (Press 1991: 388) YES
1667-1668 War of Devolution Territorial gain, power balance (Schilling
1998: 215)
YES
1672-1679 Franco-Dutch War Territorial gain, power balance (Schilling
1998: 215)
YES
1683-1684 War of the Reunions Territorial gain (Schilling 1998: 232) YES
1683-1699 Great Turkish War Confessional dispute, territorial gain
(Schilling 1998: 245-247)
YES
1684 French Conquest of Lux-
embourg
Territorial gain (Clodfelter 2008: 47) YES
1688-1698 Palatine Succession War Hereditary succession, territorial gain
(Schilling 1998: 168, 252-255)
YES
1700-1721 Great Northern War Strategic routes, power balance
(Schilling 1998: 275)
YES
1701-1714 Spanish Succession War Hereditary succession, power balance
(Schilling 1998: 214)
YES
1712 2. Villmergen War Confessional dispute, sphere of influence
(Press 1991: 389)
YES
1733-1735 Polish Succession War Hereditary succession (Clodfelter 2008:
77)
YES
1740-1748 Austrian Succession War Hereditary succession, territorial gain,
power balance (Schilling 1998: 289-290)
YES
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Date War Main Causes Plausibly
Exogenous
1756-1763 7-Years War Territorial gain, power balance, trade
dispute (Schilling 1998: 450-452)
YES
1768-1774 Confederation of the Bar
Rising
Sphere of influence (Clodfelter 2008: 97) YES
1789-1790 Belgian Revolt Restitution political order (Clodfelter
2008: 90)
YES
1792-1798 War of 1. Coalition Restitution political order, territorial
gain (Schmidt 2009: 236-237)
YES
1794 Polish Rebellion Independence (Clodfelter 2008: 100) YES
1798-1801 War of 2. Coalition Restitution political order (Schmidt
2009: 241)
YES
Notes: “Confessional dispute” means for example a dispute over being Protestant or Catholic. “Ecclesiastical
control” means for example a dispute over which church holds a bishop office. “Ecclesiastical succession” means
for example a dispute over who succeeds a bishop. “Economic crisis” means for example a dispute because of a
general economic depression. “Sphere of influence” means for example a dispute over who is the dominate power in
a contested region such as Italy. “Hereditary succession” means for example a dispute because a king dies without
male heir. “Imperial status” means for example a dispute over having elector dignity. “Independence” means for
example a dispute over political indolence of a region from a monarch’s rule. “Payment of levy” means for example
a dispute over the payment of a rent. “Political alliance” means for example a dispute because a ruler leaves a
previous political alliance. “Power balance” means for example a dispute to avoid that one polity gets too powerful
in Europe. “Restitution political order” means for example a dispute to reinstall a discharged king. “Privilege
restoration” means for example a dispute to obtain back the old privilege of legitimately using force. “Revenues
resource extraction” means for example a dispute over revenues from a monopoly. “Social discontent” means for
example a dispute because of impoverishment. “Strategic routes” means for example a dispute over the control of
the Baltic Sea. “Territorial gain” means for example a dispute because a ruler attempts to round off his territory.
“Trade dispute” means for example a dispute over the right to trade within a region. In the column that indicates
plausible exogeneity “YES” means that the war was clearly exogenous, “NO” likely endogeneity and a question
mark means that it is ambiguous whether the war was endogenous to inequality.
Only in two cases did wars actually break out because of reasons that were not plausibly exogenous
from the perspective of an individual town. The Swiss Peasant War (1653) was an ambiguous case:
the main motives behind this war were a post-war depression in agriculture and a high inflation due
to coin debasement of a number of towns (Suter 2010). Issues of economic inequality might have
played in, even though not clearly identified as relevant by the historical literature. Instead, the
German Peasants’ War (1524-1525) was likely endogenous. Discontent with the impoverishment of
lower peasant classes played a role in the outbreak of this war (Schilling 1994: 140-148). However,
in 75 out of 77 cases inequality clearly did not play a role in the outbreak of the wars according
to the historical literature, which made them plausibly exogenous events from the perspective of
individual towns.
One might be wondering whether wars breaking out because of ”territorial gain” or ”strategic
routes” might be correlated with material resources and thus inequality. For example, a prince
might want to take over a city because of the riches of its merchants. While this possibility
cannot be entirely excluded, it is unlikely to drive the results. My conflict variable does not
indicate whether a community participated in a war, i.e. was actually attacked, which could
be endogenous, but only whether it was within a fairly large radius of the battle action. This
contains the possibility of material characteristics of communities determining their treatment
status reasonably well. Moreover, I control for population size - a proxy for economic development -
29
which further reduces the possibility that local prosperity confounds the war-inequality relationship.
To further address reverse causality, I run a placebo test, where the outcome variable is regressed on
the first and second lead of the conflict variable. This is done to evaluate whether future conflicts
predict past inequality. Moreover, I test whether inequality helps predict conflict exposure.
In a later section I move to a difference-in-differences research design for the time of the Schmalkaldic
War (1546-1547), to establish a more robust causal relationship between conflicts and economic
inequality. Such a research design is not suitable for the whole period of study because treatment
occurs at different times, which makes it impossible to define a control group for the post-treatment
period. In such a set-up, the two-way fixed effects estimator is the most suitable alternative
(Goodman-Bacon 2019: 2, Cameron and Trivedi 2005: 738).
4.3 Baseline Results
The main hypothesis of this section is that there existed two countervailing effects of conflicts on
inequality – destruction and extraction – and that throughout most of the period under study the
extractive effect was larger. Yet the destructive effect on inequality likely prevailed during the
Thirty Years’ War.
Table 3: Summary statistics of main variables
(1) (2) (3)
Variables N Mean Std. deviation
Gini 436 0.561 0.144
D1 wealth share 436 0.721 0.827
D2 wealth share 436 1.640 1.358
D3 wealth share 436 2.596 1.730
D4 wealth share 436 3.636 2.074
D5 wealth share 436 4.924 2.388
D6 wealth share 436 6.480 2.844
D7 wealth share 436 8.530 3.144
D8 wealth share 436 11.76 3.512
D9 wealth share 436 17.70 3.767
D10 wealth share 436 42.02 15.38
Top 5% 436 28.28 14.21
Bottom 50% 436 13.52 7.481
Conflict exposure 436 0.706 0.456
Notes: “D10” is equivalent to the top 10% of the population.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the inequality and conflict exposure indicators employed in
this section. Before analysing how overall economic inequality has changed when a locality was
exposed to a conflict, it is worth observing how the shape of the wealth distribution changed when
a locality was exposed to a conflict.
In Figure 7 the coefficients of the simplest specification, which includes only locality and time fixed
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Figure 7: Conflict exposure and wealth share change during ordinary conflicts
effects, and the main variable of interest, conflict exposure, are plotted. As dependent variables
the wealth shares of the deciles of the population have been taken. The plotted coefficients are
the point estimates on the conflict exposure indicator. In other words, the graph shows how the
entire wealth distribution changed in localities that were exposed to a conflict, in the periods 1400
to 1600 and 1675 to 1800.
In line with the conceptual framework introduced above, the wealth shares of the lowest five deciles
of the population did decrease significantly. The upper-middle class of the wealth distribution
(deciles 6 to 8) did not experience significant variation. The ninth decile experiences some wealth
share increase, but only the top 10% (or D10) of the wealth distribution did experience a significant
increase of its wealth share. Note that the growing confidence intervals are the result of a simple
scale effect: higher deciles possess larger shares of the total wealth in a locality and thus experience
higher variation.
Table 4 reports the baseline results for the impact of conflict exposure within 150 kilometres of
a locality and inequality. All estimates include locality and time fixed effects (unless otherwise
indicated), which account for time-invariant, locality-specific features and for shocks that influence
all localities.
Columns 1 to 4 of Table 4 employ the Gini coefficient as measure of inequality. Column 1 shows
that the occurrence of a conflict was associated with an increase in inequality by 0.021 Gini points,



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































One could imagine adding locality-specific time trends to the baseline specification. This is done
in Column 2, which yields an estimate on the conflict exposure variable that is just not significant.
It should be noted that the panel includes 72 localities, that is, many localities with relatively
few observations over time per unit. Including locality-specific time trends amounts to adding 72
variables, which seem clearly too many considering the relatively small number of observations and
hence reduces the precision of the estimate of interest. Moreover, many of the units are part of
the dataset for few periods only. This makes it more likely that time trends capture Gini-change
that is in reality attributable to the conflict exposure measure (see Angrist and Pischke 2009: 239).
For that reason, in Column 3, I have only kept those units that are part of the dataset for at
least 300 years. Using that restricted dataset, the main variable of interest is significant even when
locality-specific time trends are included. This specification addresses also, at least to some extent,
concerns about panel non-response, potentially introduced by selective attrition (Lechner et al.
2016, Schneider 2020).36 Only one locality is part of the dataset over the whole period of study and
it is not possible to build a meaningful balanced panel. However, the specification estimated on the
limited dataset indicates that it is unlikely that the potential bias introduced by the unbalanced
structure of the panel leads to an overestimation of the effect of warfare on inequality.
In Column 4 the first lag of the conflict exposure variable has been added. One could imagine
that conflicts which happened further in the past than one period might have had an impact on
inequality. The coefficient points into the right direction but is just not significant. The main
variable of interest remains highly significant and positive though. The downside of including a
lagged variable is that one loses many observations of an already small dataset. Two information
criteria tests have been performed to determine the right lag length. The tests weigh the gain of
explanatory power through adding lagged variables against the loss of observations (Kennedy 2008:
95). The Akaike Information Criteria and the Bayesian Schwarz Information Criteria tests both
suggest that the first lag of the conflict exposure variable should not be included, which is why it
is absent in all further specifications.
Figure 7 has already shown that the wealth distribution became more unequal at both ends when
a locality was exposed to a conflict. Column 5 of Table 4 shows that the wealth share of the
poorest 50% of the population decreased by 1.456 percent when there was a conflict. This is quite
a substantial reduction considering the low share of wealth owned by the Bottom 50% (see Table
3). Column 6 shows that the Top 5% of the population gained at the same time 1.069 percent of
total wealth. The results suggest that exposure to ordinary conflicts redistributed resources from
rich to poor households.
Overall, the results in Figure 7 and Table 4 show evidence for a positive and significant effect of
conflict exposure on inequality in preindustrial Germany. This relationship holds when different
measures of inequality are employed. Conflicts reduced the wealth share of the poor substantially
and increased the wealth share of the rich. This result is in line with the conceptual framework
introduced above, which argues that economic resources were extracted regressively in reaction to
36Note that the availability of inequality data depends on the survival and availability of relevant archival doc-




What was the impact of conflicts on economic inequality during the time of the Thirty Years’ War?
Column 7 includes also the data for the period 1625 to 1650, approximately the period of the war.
Conflict exposure is interacted with two dummy variables: the first one indicates the period from
1400 to 1600 and the third one from 1675 to 1800, the two sub-period where a positive conflict-
inequality relationship is hypothesised. The second dummy indicates the period 1625 to 1650.
Unsurprisingly, the coefficient on the first interaction term is positive and significant. The second
coefficient is negative. This result too reflects what one would expect – that the destructive effect
of warfare was larger than the extractive effect during the Thirty Years’ War – but the coefficient
is not significant. Still, this specification indicates that the warfare-inequality relationship during
the Thirty Years’ War was significantly different from the relationship during the previous period.
The coefficient on the dummy that indicates the period 1675 to 1800 is positive and sizeable but
just not significant.
Columns 8 to 11 show a similar picture. The dataset has been split into three subperiods, covering
the time before, during and after the Thirty Years’ War. The periods covered in Columns 8 and
11 show, as expected, a significant and positive conflict-inequality relationship. The relationship is
even stronger towards the end of the early modern period. It probably reflects the acceleration of
the Military Revolution: the increased firepower of weapons made it necessary to increase the size
of armed forces, to improve equipment and to strengthen fortifications. When military technology
advanced political authorities had to extract an increasing amount of resources to pay for defence
and bureaucratic infrastructures and the direct costs of war (Kroener 2013: 25, 33, 32–44). This
happened via inegalitarian channels and made the extractive effect of warfare outweigh even more
than before the destructive effect on inequality.
Instead, the coefficient in Column 9 points towards a negative but insignificant conflict-inequality
relationship during the time of the Thirty Years’ War. Still, this specification indicates that the
warfare-inequality relationship during that war was significantly different from the relationship
before and after it in Columns 8 and 11. Moreover, this insignificant result does not indicate that
the Thirty Years’ War had no negative effect on inequality. It was quite the opposite, as Column
10 shows, where the time fixed effects have been left out. In that specification conflicts were related
significantly negatively to inequality. In other words, inequality decreased substantially during the
Thirty Years’ War, but warfare does not seem to capture this decline, unless one allows the conflict
exposure indicator to capture some of the variation in inequality that all localities experienced.
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the Thirty Years’ War had a different impact
on economic inequality compared to ordinary conflicts because of its exceptional spill-over effects:
physical destruction, plundering and the reduction of trade and commerce led to an economic crisis,
which brought about food scarcity, famine and created the breeding ground for widespread famine,
plague and death. In consequence, the Thirty Years’ War had a globally destructive impact that
went far beyond the immediate destruction of battle action, to which ordinary conflicts were instead
limited. Note that the results in Columns 9 and 10 might also reflect that the distance within which
a conflict had an impact on economic inequality increased during the Thirty Years’ War. A later
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section provides some tentative evidence for this hypothesis.
One might wonder how the conflict-inequality relationship looked like over the whole period 1400
to 1800. The coefficient in Column 12 shows that it was positive and significant but, unsurprisingly,
slightly smaller compared to the estimate in Column 1. This suggests that notwithstanding the
exceptionally negative effect of the Thirty Years’ War, there was a generally positive relationship
that ran from conflict exposure to economic inequality in preindustrial Germany.
How economically relevant is the effect of conflict exposure for explaining variation in inequality?
One possibility for assessing the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is to compare it to the
standard deviation of the dependent variable. A one-standard deviation increase in conflict exposure
(0.466) is associated with an increase in the Gini coefficient by 15 percent of a standard deviation,
which is a sizeable effect (estimate in Column 1 of Table 4; for summary statistics see Table 3).
An alternative way to assess the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is to consider that aggregate
inequality has grown during the century preceding the Thirty Years’ War by 0.0839 Gini points
(see Figure 5). Localities were exposed to a conflict on average 0.723 times during every of the four
periods of that century. Let us assume that every time a locality was exposed inequality increased
by 0.021 Gini points, which is the magnitude of the coefficient estimated in Column 1 of Table 4.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that conflicts might explain around 72 percent of the
inequality increase during the century prior to the Thirty Years’ War.37 Thus, conflict exposure
in any quarter century accounts for about a fourth of the typical increase of inequality over the
century. This suggests that the effect of conflict exposure was not only statistically significant, but
also economically relevant.
Overall, the evidence presented in this section supports the claim that there were two significantly
different conflict-inequality regimes operating in preindustrial Germany from 1400 to 1800: dur-
ing the Thirty Years’ War, the destructive effect of wars on inequality dominated, but during
ordinary conflicts the extractive effect was larger. This explains why the coefficients on the con-
flict exposure measure are significantly different from each other in the two periods. The positive
conflict-inequality relationship seems to hold even over the whole period for which data are currently
available. In sum, it seems true that the Thirty Years’ War was a “Great Leveller” (Scheidel 2017),
but the many smaller conflicts – paradigmatic of life in the premodern world – were continuous
reinforcers of inequality.
4.4 Threshold Distance Test
In Table 5 I repeat the baseline specification, but now testing different distances (25, 50, 100, 150,
200, 250 and 300 kilometres) between localities and conflicts. This is done to substantiate the
assumption that 150 kilometres is indeed a reasonable threshold distance for conflict exposure.
Intuitively, being closer to a conflict could have two opposite effects: it could lead to higher in-
37The average inequality growth explained warfare during the sixteenth century has been obtained by multiplying
the regression coefficient with the average conflict exposure of 0.723 times per period. This is multiplied with four,
the number of periods of the sixteenth century. The result is then expressed as the fraction of the aggregate inequality
growth during the sixteenth century.
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equality because the costs of warfare are probably greater and hence political authorities need to
extract more resources in an inegalitarian way. Instead, being closer to a conflict could also reduce
inequality, if the destructive effect outweighed the extractive one in the geographically very limited
radius where the battle action took place.
The results in Columns 1 to 7 confirm that intuition. Column 1 shows the impact of conflicts that
took place within 25 kilometres of a locality. The point estimate is negative, pointing towards a
reduction of inequality, but it is not significant. Columns 2 to 4 show that increasing the threshold
distance gradually to 150 kilometres increases the point estimate and its significance. Yet also
the goodness of fit of the model improves, as the adjusted R-squared indicates. A 150-kilometres
threshold maximise the goodness of fit across all specifications in Columns 1 to 7, which is why
it has been chosen as the relevant threshold. At distances greater than 200 kilometres the effect































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Column 8 I include the conflict exposure variable for the 25- and 150-kilometres threshold in
the same specification. If the hypothesis of this paper is true that there existed two countervailing
effects of warfare – destruction in the immediate area around a conflict that reduced inequality and
extraction in the wider area that increased inequality – then we would expect a negative coefficient
on the 25 kilometres threshold and a positive one on the 150 kilometres threshold. This is exactly
what we get. The coefficient on the 25-kilometre indicator, although just not significant (p-value
0.115), points towards a direct effect that reduced inequality. At the same time the coefficient on
the 150-kilometre indicator indicates an indirect effect of conflicts that increased inequality. The
result also supports the idea that of the two countervailing factors, the positive impact of extraction
on inequality was likely larger.
These results give confidence that 150 kilometres is a reasonable threshold distance for conflict
exposure. It is roughly in line with the threshold used in recent studies on the impact of conflicts
on locality-level outcomes (Dincecco and Onorato 2016, 2018). Interestingly, 150 kilometres is also
roughly in line with Chilosi et al.’s (2018 see Appendix C) study, who find empirically that the sum
of invested capital declines massively in a radius of 150 to 200 kilometres around a town. Moreover,
150 kilometres seems historically reasonable. It corresponds approximately to the distance that
messengers – and with them the information about a conflict – could cover in about one and a half
to two days in sixteenth to eighteenth century Germany (Denecke 1990: 217, Volckart 2000b: 274).
In Columns 9 to 11 some conflict distance thresholds have been tested for the time of the Thirty
Years’ War. Unsurprisingly, the conflict-inequality relationship seems to have been constantly
negative during that time. Moreover, one would expect that if the Thirty Years’ War was really
different from ordinary preindustrial conflicts – as hypothesised in the conceptual framework – then
the relevant conflict distance threshold should be wider. The reason for this was most likely that
the war entailed important spill-over effects across Germany, which created an impact that went
well beyond the immediate battle action. Column 10 suggests that this was exactly the case. The
point estimate for a distance of 300 kilometres is negative, sizeable, significant and maximises the
goodness of fit of the model for that period. The same threshold distance was not significant at
other times (see Column 7). This result reinforces the main hypothesis of this paper: during the
Thirty Years’ War a significantly different conflict-inequality regime prevailed compared to ordinary
wars. It seems that the destructiveness of conflicts during the Thirty Years’ War had a much more
global impact on inequality, while ordinary conflicts had a destructive effect that was more locally
contained.
5 Robustness Checks of the Baseline Results
The evidence presented so far supports the view that there were two countervailing effects of conflicts
on inequality – destruction and extraction – and that throughout most of the period under study the
extractive effect was larger. Conflicts increased economic inequality in preindustrial Germany, with
the period of the Thirty Years’ War being an exception to that pattern. This section tests whether
these results are robust. The analysis controls for several time-variant and time-invariant locality
characteristics that might have had an impact on inequality. Then, a falsification test is performed,
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which provides some evidence that reverse causality does not drive the results. Ultimately, I test
whether the main results hold when an alternative conflict measure is employed. I focus on the
period 1400 to 1618 and 1675 to 1800, first, because the positive relationship running from conflicts
to rising inequality during that time is the novel finding of this paper. Secondly, for the period
1625 to 1650 the data are not sufficient to perform meaningful robustness tests.
5.1 Controls for Locality Characteristics
The analysis controls for several time-variant and time-invariant locality characteristics that might
have had an impact on economic inequality. Most of the information about locality characteristics
comes from the Städtebuch for Germany and Austria, a multi-volume encyclopedia of cities and
towns in Germany since the high Middle Ages.38
In Column 1 (Table 6) demographic controls – the log-population size and the occurrence of an
epidemic – are included. Column 1 shows that the result for conflict exposure is robust to the
inclusion of demographic controls.
Column 2 includes institutional controls: a participative local government, the introduction of the
Protestant Reformation, the log-distance to the closest university and the log of the taxes that the
imperial estate had to pay to the Empire. Column 2 shows that the main result is robust to the
inclusion of these institutional controls. The point estimate is 0.020, significant at the 1% level.
In Column 3 geographic controls – agricultural potential, log-distance to a major river, seaside
locality – are included. Since these are all time-invariant variables, they can only be included in
a panel framework with fixed effects when interacted with time dummies. The inclusion of these
variables yields a point estimate of 0.017, but significance is reduced. This is probably due to the
interaction terms that use many degrees of freedom of a small dataset and reduces the precision of
the estimate of interest.
38The Appendix provides further details about the coding of variables and additional regression results for all
controls. Moreover a test for the presence of spatial dependence following Kelly (2019) has been performed. However,





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Column 4 all time-variant controls have been included. The point estimate is the same as in the
previous column, significant at the 5% level. In Column 5 all controls are included. This yields
a slightly less significant estimate than in Columns 1, 3 and 4, probably because of the “costly”
interaction terms of the geographic controls. Yet the point estimate remains very similar. In general,
the point estimate on the conflict exposure variable remains very stable across specifications. This
could hint at conflict exposure being uncorrelated with locality characteristics, that is, indeed
exogenous events from the perspective of an individual town, but it could also be due to some of
the controls not varying in every period.
Columns 6 and 7 include all controls but taking the wealth shares of the Bottom 50% and the
Top 5% as dependant variables. The results confirm what has been shown in the previous section:
warfare redistributed economic resources from the poor part of the population to the rich, that is,
it increased inequality.
Columns 8 to 11 provide some tentative evidence for the hypothesised mechanism driving the
conflict-inequality relationship. Some locality characteristics have been interacted with conflict
exposure, which consume many degrees of freedom and one should not be over-confident in finding
significant results. In Column 8 conflict exposure has been interacted with the participation of town
inhabitants in their local government. If Minns et al. (2020: 603) are right that in communities with
less political participation of citizens the institutional framework reflects interests of elites, then we
would expect a negative interaction between participation and conflict exposure. The channels that
more inclusive governments chose to cover the costs of warfare might have been less inegalitarian,
for example because of levying a general wealth tax instead of a highly regressive poll tax. The
coefficient points into this direction but is not significant.
One might be wondering to what extent the wider constitutional context mattered in which a local-
ity was integrated. Specifically, a substantial literature has pointed out that defence infrastructure
of pre-modern polities was subject to economies of scale (Glaeser and Shapiro 2002: 209, Volckart
2002b: 326, Alesina and Spolaore 2003: 179). Imperial cities were city-states within the Empire,
that is, very small polities. Imperial cities had to maintain a state-like apparatus on their own
to provide protection for their population. On a per capita basis, this implied higher costs and
a higher need to extract resources via inegalitarian channels,39 compared to territorial towns that
were part of other types of territories and that could potentially benefit from economies of scale.
One would expect that imperial cities experienced a significantly higher increase in inequality when
exposed to a conflict. The coefficient in Column 9 indicates that this was the case.
The conceptual framework suggests that the construction of buildings that had a military purpose
was one of the channels through which conflict exposure had an impact on inequality (see Hohrath
1996, Rödel 2003, Isenmann 2014: 100-102). In Columns 10 and 11 I add a variable that indicates
whether there was military construction activity (e.g. barracks, arsenals, Schützenhaus) in a local-
ity.40 The results show some evidence for the existence of a positive relationship between military
39In fact, imperial cities are explicitly recognized in the historical literature for their pronounced capacity to tax
their inhabitants (North 2012: 146), that is, extract resources via inegalitarian channels.
40These data are available for a subset of the localities in the dataset only. I have coded the variable as Cantoni
et al. (2018).
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construction and wealth inequality. Importantly, the coefficient size of conflict exposure in Column
5 is reduced by about a fourth and significance is reduced compared to the baseline estimate in
Table 4. This is exactly what one would expect if construction for military purposes had indeed
been one of the channels that linked conflict exposure to rising economic inequality.
5.2 Correlates of Conflict Exposure
One might wonder whether conflict exposure was related to certain locality-specific characteristics.
Moreover, one might ask whether increasing the conflict exposure threshold changes the character-
istics of localities that are part of the treatment group. To address these concerns Table 7 reports
how localities’ treatment status at different distances (50km, 100km, 300km) correlates with some
locality-specific characteristics over the whole period of study (1400 to 1800).
Table 7: Correlates of conflict exposure
(1) (2) (3)
Conflict 50km Conflict 150km Conflict 300km
1400-1800
Gini -0.130 0.447 -0.191
(0.352) (0.310) (0.150)
Log-population size -0.094 -0.106 0.057
(0.100) (0.077) (0.056)
Epidemic -0.232*** -0.128** 0.056
(0.066) (0.062) (0.040)
Participative government -0.009 0.259** 0.061
(0.104) (0.122) (0.060)
Protestant reformation 0.120 0.233** -0.074*
(0.118) (0.109) (0.039)
Log-university distance -0.034 -0.066 -0.006
(0.095) (0.099) (0.048)
Log-imperial tax 0.022 -0.120 0.086
(0.146) (0.126) (0.056)
Geographic controls×time YES YES YES
Locality FE YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES
Observations 436 436 436
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.322 0.489
Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Standard errors clustered at locality level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results of the 50- (Column 1) and 150-kilometers threshold (Column 2) show that locality
specific characteristics do not change substantially between the two distances. The coefficients
point into the same direction for most of the variables. Only for log-imperial taxation we get a
different sign between the 50-kilometre threshold compared to the 150-kilometer threshold. The
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levels of significance differ between Columns 1 and 2. While the outbreak of an epidemic was
related significantly to conflict exposure for the localities within the 50-kilometer threshold, they
were not related significantly to conflict exposure within the 150-kilometer threshold.
Instead, there is evidence that conflict exposure within the 150-kilometer threshold was related to
the presence of a participative local government and the introduction of the Protestant Reforma-
tion. For the localities within the 300-kilometer threshold there is some evidence of a significant
relationship between conflict exposure and the Protestant Reformation, but in contrast to the
150-kilometer threshold it is negative.
One might also ask whether conflict exposure was related to inequality. Across all specifications
and threshold distances the Gini-coefficient is not significantly correlated with conflict exposure.
Overall, none of the factors seem consistently correlated with conflict exposure across different
threshold distances. This result provides some additional evidence for the claim that wars were
plausibly exogenous from the perspective of an individual locality.
5.3 Falsification Test
To provide further evidence for a robust relationship between conflict exposure and economic in-
equality, a falsification test is performed for the periods before and after the Thirty Years’ War.
Future conflicts, that is, those conflicts that happened in the quarter-century after the inequality
measurement, are used as placebo. The first and second lead of the conflict dummy are the inde-
pendent variables of interest. As dependent variables the Gini coefficient and the top 10% wealth
share are employed. If the relationship actually ran from conflicts to inequality during the period
of interest, then future conflicts should not predict past inequality, evidenced by an insignificant
coefficient. This approach is a test for the presence of reverse causality.
Table 8: Falsification test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini
1400-1600 & 1675-1800
Conflict exposure (1. lead) 0.007 -0.113 0.011 0.041
(0.011) (1.052) (0.014) (1.525)
Conflict exposure (2. lead) -0.009 -1.146 -0.006 -1.135
(0.013) (1.299) (0.015) (1.498)
All controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Locality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 325 325 271 271 271 271
Adjusted R2 0.456 0.372 0.533 0.456 0.533 0.453
Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Standard errors clustered at locality level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8 shows that future conflict exposure (first and second lead) did not predict past inequality,
whether measured with the Gini coefficient or the top 10% wealth share. None of the coefficients,
neither on the first or second yield, are significant. This strengthens the argument that it was past
conflict exposure that led to an increase in inequality.
5.4 Alternative Conflict Measures
As a final robustness check, an alternative conflict measure is employed. So far, the analysis has
made use of a simple dummy variable. As discussed above, using a dummy has the advantage of
mitigating potential measurement error. I have constructed a categorical variable as an alternative,
which takes the value zero if there was no conflict, one if there was exactly one conflict and two if
the locality was exposed to more than one conflict.
Table 9: Alternative conflict measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini Gini Gini Gini
1400-1600 & 1675-1800
Conflict exposure (ordered) 0.007* 0.006* 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Conflict exposure (singular exposure) 0.024**
(0.011)
Conflict exposure (repeated exposure) -0.010
(0.010)
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES
Institutional controls NO YES YES YES
Geographic controls×time NO NO YES YES
Locality FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 380 380 380 380
Adjusted R2 0.373 0.372 0.438 0.443
Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Standard errors clustered at locality level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In Columns 1 to 3 of Table 9 the control variables are gradually added to the specification. Unsur-
prisingly, the coefficients are smaller, but point into the right direction and are significant. Only
when the geographical controls interacted with time are added is the coefficient not significant
anymore.
Another alternative measure is reported in Column 4, where two dummy variables are employed.
The first takes the value one when a community was exposed to exactly one conflict. The second
dummy takes the value one if the community was exposed to at least two conflicts. Both coefficients
point into the right direction but only the one on the singular-exposure dummy is significant. The
coefficient on the repeated-exposure dummy is just not significant.
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Overall, the results obtained with alternative conflict exposure measures strengthen the interpreta-
tion of the results obtained with the main conflict measure, suggesting a positive effect of conflict
exposure on economic inequality.41
This section has tested whether the baseline results are robust. The analysis has controlled for
several time-variant and -invariant locality characteristics, a falsification test has been performed
and it has been shown that the results hold when employing an alternative conflict measure. This
strengthens the main hypothesis of this paper that ordinary conflicts (i.e. those that took place
between 1400 to 1600 and 1675 to 1800) had a positive and economically relevant impact on
inequality in preindustrial Germany. These results have been obtained by applying several strategies
for mitigating the possibility of omitted variable bias and reverse causality.
6 Case Study: the Schmalkaldic War (1546-1547)
The previous section did not employ an experimental research design. An instrumental variable for
conflicts is not available at the current state of research and the continuous occurrence of wars does
not allow to employ a difference-in-differences research design because treatment occurs at different
times. This makes the typical difference-in-differences estimator unfeasible because it is impossible
to define a control group for the post-treatment period (Goodman-Bacon 2019: 2). However, it
is possible to use a difference-in-differences research design for single wars. In this section I move
to a such a research design for the time of the Schmalkaldic War (1546-1547), to establish a more
robust causal relationship between conflicts and economic inequality.
The historical reasons why this war broke out suggest that it was a plausibly exogenous event from
the perspective of an individual town. The Schmalkaldic War was one of the “Religious Wars” of
the sixteenth century. In 1530 the reformed minority at the Imperial Diet raised a formal protest
against the majority-decision to outlaw Luther. Some of these ‘Protestant’ imperial estates then
met in the town of Schmalkalden in Hesse to form the Schmalkaldic League, an alliance for the
protection and promotion of Lutheranism. The ‘Schmalkaldic League’ did this so effectively that
Charles V eventually decided that without destroying it, he would never be secure in his position
as ruler of the Empire. However, an open confrontation was postponed, due to the emperor’s
ongoing conflicts with the Ottoman Empire and France. When these were over, Charles V began
in secret to prepare his attack in 1546. He obtained 12,500 soldiers and huge sums of money from
the Pope and promised the Dukes of Saxony and Bavaria elector dignity for their support in the
conflict. Then in 1546, the emperor started his attack against the Schmalkaldic League, in the first
battle near Füssen in Southern Germany (Schilling 1994: 213, 229-230, Whaley 2012: 304-320).
Other conflicts took place in the Centre-South, the North-West and the East of Germany. Local
41One might also ask whether there is a significant relationship between inequality and the actual distance to the
nearest conflict. However, such a measure would be problematic because it could not capture the changing nature
of the conflict-inequality relationship across different distances, as shown before. Conflicts that were very close to a
locality were probably destructive and reduced inequality. As the distance increased and destruction was not an issue
anymore, the conflict-inequality relationship became positive. Yet a too large distance between conflict and locality
would capture the conflict-inequality relationship worse. These dynamics are unlikely to be adequately captured by
a continuous distance measure.
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governments – for example in Augsburg (see Roth 1928: 372) – increased inegalitarian taxation to
extract the necessary means to cover the costs of the Schmalkaldic War.
Figure 8: Inequality trends: treatment and control groups
Notes: The trend lines of Gini change have been obtained by regressing an unbalanced panel
of Gini coefficients on a full set of locality fixed effects and year dummies (reference year
1475). This has been done separately for the treatment and control groups. The coefficients
on the year dummies represent aggregate Gini change for the respective groups (see Clark
2005: 1322-1323 and Alfani et al. 2020: 82-84.
Figure 8 reports inequality trends for the treatment and control groups. The dataset is limited to
all those localities for which a comparison of inequality before and after the Schmalkaldic War is
possible. The treatment-group consists of all localities that were exposed to battle action of the
Schmalkaldic War, taking the usual 150 kilometres threshold. The control group consists of the
observations of localities that have not been exposed to the Schmalkaldic War. The main identifying
assumption is that inequality in communities with exposure to the Schmalkaldic War would have
evolved similar to non-affected communities had the war not occurred. Figure 8 provides visual
evidence suggesting that pre-war trends in observables are indeed parallel. These common trends
indirectly support the identifying assumption (see Angrist and Pischke 2009: 231-233).
One might wonder about the implications of setting the conflict-proximity threshold wrongly, which
determines the allocation to treatment and control groups. The Schmalkaldic War was an important
war and a sensational success for Emperor Charles V (Schilling 1994: 230-232). It could be that
places further away than 150 kilometres reacted to this event. However, in actuality this is only
a minor concern. The consequence would be that localities which were effectively treated, are
considered part of the control group. This would most likely bias my estimate of the effect of the
Schmalkaldic War downwards and lead me to underestimate the true effect of the war but not
overestimate it.
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In order to identify the effect of the Schmalkaldic War on economic inequality Equation 7 is esti-
mated, which is almost identical to Equation 6 from the previous sections. The main difference is
the inclusion of an interaction term between a post-treatment indicator (Pt) and treatment status
(Wi), where treated-status means having been exposed to the Schmalkaldic War. The coefficient
theta (θ) on the interaction term is the main coefficient of interest. In addition to the vector of
controls (Xi,t), a variable (Ci,t−1) indicates the exposure to other conflicts in the previous period
than the Schmalkaldic War:
Ii,t = αi + πt + θPt ×Wi + βCi,t−1 + γ′Xi,t + εi,t (7)
Table 10 reports the results. Column 1 reports the baseline specification and in Column 2 all
controls have been added. The coefficients indicate a positive, sizeable and highly significant effect
of the Schmalkaldic War on economic inequality, measured with the Gini coefficient. In Column
3 the Bottom 50% and in Column 4 the Top 5% wealth share have been employed as alternative
inequality measures. They indicate that the Schmalkaldic War led to a sizeable wealth share loss
of the poorer half of the population and an even more sizeable gain of the richest part of the
population, of 4.8 percent.
Table 10: Difference-in-differences estimates: the Schmalkaldic War
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini Gini Bot. 50% Top 5% Gini Gini
1450-1600 1450-1800
Post×War 0.038*** 0.045*** -2.196*** 4.807** 0.052*** 0.034***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.553) (2.221) (0.012) (0.012)
Post×War×League -0.030
(0.021)
Demographic controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Institutional controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Geographic controls×time NO YES YES YES YES YES
Locality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 230 230 230 230 230 321
Adjusted R2 0.261 0.401 0.389 0.185 0.405 0.506
Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Standard errors clustered at locality level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Scheidel (2017: 199) hypothesises that premodern wars decreased economic inequality in a par-
ticularly pronounced way among the losers of a war because of the more intense destruction and
plundering that the defeated might have experienced. The Schmalkaldic War makes it possible to
test this argument. The war had a clear loser: the members of the defence alliance Schmalkaldic
League (Schilling 1994: 232). In Column 5 an interaction of three variables has been added: the
post-treatment period, whether a locality was exposed to the war and a dummy variable that in-
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dicates whether a locality was part of the Schmalkaldic League. A significantly negative coefficient
would indicate that among the treated localities, those that were part of the loser group experienced
a differential effect of the war on inequality, compared to all other treated localities. The coefficient
indicates that being among the losers of the Schmalkaldic War did not significantly reduce a local-
ity’s inequality compared to all other treated localities. The main coefficient of interest remains
positive, indicating an inequality-increasing effect of the war, and significant at the 1-percent level.
The specification in Column 6 includes also the period after the Thirty Years’ War. It shows
that notwithstanding the potentially disruptive effect of the Thirty Years’ War, localities that
were exposed to the Schmalkaldic War (not differentiating between losers and non-losers) were
significantly more unequal than localities that were not exposed.
In sum, this section has tested the conflict-inequality hypothesis in a difference-in-differences setting,
for the time of the Schmalkaldic War. This establishes a more robust causal relationship between
conflicts and economic inequality. I find a strong and positive effect of the Schmalkaldic War on
economic inequality, and a negative effect on the wealth of the poor. The results are robust to the
inclusion of demographic, institutional and geographic controls. The hypothesis that being among
the losers of a war reduced economic inequality could not be confirmed. These case study results
strengthen the results obtained in the main analysis.
7 Conclusion
This paper has examined the claim that preindustrial wars were a “Great Leveller” for economic
inequality (Scheidel 2017) in preindustrial Germany from 1400 to 1800. The findings suggest that
the “war reduces inequality”-hypothesis holds true for the Thirty Years War. However, the Thirty
Years’ War was the exception and not the rule. Ordinary conflicts led to a redistribution of wealth
from the rich to the poor parts of the population and consequently increased inequality. The impact
of ordinary wars was significantly different from the impact of the Thirty Years’ War.
The explanation for these seemingly puzzling findings is that there were two countervailing effects of
conflicts on inequality: egalitarian destruction and inegalitarian extraction. During ordinary wars
and throughout most of the period under study the second effect was larger. Maintaining peace
and providing protection for inhabitants were fundamental tasks of towns in preindustrial Germany.
The risk of being attacked during a war increased a community’s demand for protection and made
the extension of defence and bureaucratic infrastructure necessary. The necessary resources were
extracted through channels that inevitably increased inequality: regressive taxation, credit and
cooperation with financially strong organisations.
These findings could potentially lead to far-reaching lessons for the history of economic inequality.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that regular warfare usually increased inequality.
This might explain in part the preindustrial inequality rise, a process that saw inequality rising
substantially throughout the early modern period, and which led to relatively high levels of in-
equality across Europe already before industrialisation began (see Alfani 2020). Warfare seems to
explain a good part of this preindustrial inequality rise.
48
As a final reflection, it should be remembered that military conflicts were an expression of geo-
political rivalries and competition. Such competition between polities has been praised for its
economically beneficial effects on institutional quality, state capacity and a society’s innovativeness
in preindustrial times (North 1981: 27, Volckart 1999: 32-38, Gennaioli and Voth 2014: 1409,
Dincecco 2015: 909-915, Mokyr 2016: 206-207). It has even been suggested that premodern Eu-
rope’s political fragmentation was among the root causes of Europe’s rise to riches, especially in
comparison with China (Hoffman 2011: 105, Scheidel 2019). However, one of the implications of
this paper is that geo-political competition between polities had considerable economic downsides.
One downside was rising economic inequality because rivalry induced political authorities to extract
economic resources in an inegalitarian way.
49
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Bartels, C., S. Jäger, and N. Obergruber (2020). Long-Term Effects of Equal Sharing: Evidence
from Inheritance Rules for Land. IZA Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper 13665 .
Basten, C. and F. Betz (2013). Beyond Work Ethic: Religion, Individual, and Political Preferences.
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5 (3), 67–91.
Baten, J. and C. Mumme (2013). Does inequality lead to civil wars? A global long-term study
using anthropometric indicators (1816–1999). European Journal of Political Economy 32, 56–79.
Becker, S., A. Ferrara, E. Melander, and L. Pascali (2018). Wars, Local Political Institutions, and
Fiscal Capacity: Evidence from Six Centuries of German History. Warwick Economics Research
Papers 1182, 1–55.
Besley, T. and M. Reynal-Querol (2014). The legacy of historical conflict: Evidence from Africa.
American Political Science Review 108, 319–336.
Blaschke, K. (1989). Fiskus, Kirche und Staat in Sachsen vor und während der Reformation. In
H. Kellenbenz and P. Prodi (Eds.), Fiskus, Kirche und Staat im konfessionnellen Zeitalter, pp.
53–69. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot.
Blattman, C. and E. Miguel (2010). Civil War. Journal of Economic Literature 48 (1), 3–57.
Blickle, P. (1981). Deutsche Untertanen. München: C. H. Beck.
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Brandstätter, K. (2009). Österreichischer Krieg, 1410-1413. In Historisches Lexikon Bayerns.
Brecke, P. (1999). Violent Conflicts 1400 A.D. to the Present in Different Regions of the World. In
Contribution 1999 meeting of the Peace Science Society.
Broadberry, S., B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton, and B. van Leeuwen (2015). British Economic
Growth, 1270–1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
51
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der H. Laupp’schen Buchhandlung.
Buggeln, M. (2019). Das Versprechen der Gleichheit: Progressive Steuern und die Reduktion
sozialer Ungleichheit 1871 bis 1945.
Burkhardt, J. (1992). Der Dreißigjährige Krieg. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
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Appendices
A Spatial and temporal distribution of rural and urban commu-
nities
Figure 9 shows the spatial distribution of the 72 urban and rural localities from which this study
uses inequality data. I have classified a place as rural or urban depending on whether or not it has
an entry in the Deutsches Städtebuch and the Österreichisches Städtebuch (from now on simply
Städtebuch) (Keyser 1939, 1941, 1952, 1954, 1956, 1957, 1959, 1962, 1964, Keyser and Stoob 1971,
1974, Baltzarek et al. 1973).
Figure 9: Spatial distribution of localities
Notes: Urban localities depicted in yellow, rural localities in red. Borders of the inner and
wider Holy Roman Empire around 1545 from Volckart (2020).
Table 11 shows how many communities are included in the dataset for every year of the analysis.
62
Table 11: Temporal distribution of local wealth distributions, c. 1400 – 1800
Year Total localities Urban localities Rural localities
1400 7 7 0
1425 10 9 1
1450 14 13 1
1475 28 15 13
1500 45 20 25
1525 41 19 23
1550 47 22 26
1575 52 20 33
1600 44 14 31
1625 27 15 13
1650 29 14 16
1675 18 11 7
1700 16 10 6
1725 16 10 6
1750 15 9 6
1775 14 8 6
1800 13 7 6
B Control variables
This appendix explains how the control variables used in the main text have been coded.
Log-population size. The population size of a locality has been obtained by multiplying the number
of taxpayers in a given year with the presumed average household size. The household size that is
typically assumed for preindustrial German towns is 4.5 Minns et al. 2020: 11.
Epidemic. A dummy that indicates whether there was an outbreak of an epidemic in a locality
in the previous period. Information on major outbreaks of epidemics has been taken from the
Städtebuch. For those villages in the dataset that have no entry in the Städtebuch I had to make
an assumption. For those villages that were taxed by a nearby town, I have assumed the same
occurrence of epidemics as in the taxing town. For those villages that were not taxed by a nearby
town I have assumed the same occurrence of epidemics as in the closest town with an entry in
the Städtebuch. These assumptions are rooted in the regular interaction between village and town
inhabitants via urban markets in preindustrial times. Towns were daily markets where peasants
from surrounding villages regularly sold agricultural products and bought goods that they could not
produce themselves Isenmann 2014: 673. Epidemics indicated by the Städtebuch are for example
smallpox, syphilis and different forms of plague.
Participative government. A dummy that indicates whether there was burgher participation in the
local government. I follow the classification of Wahl (2019), who defines defines participation as
one of three arrangements: first, town councils with guild participation (e.g. guilds having seats in
the small council (Kleiner Rat) or inner council (Innerer Rat of a town); secondly, institutionalized
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burgher representation (e.g. a regular assembly of burghers often called great council (Großer
Rat) that usually met when the town council had an important decision to take; thirdly, citizens
participate in elections through a participative election procedure (e.g. election of the mayor).
Information about participative governments are taken from the Städtebuch (Keyser 1939, 1941,
1952, 1954, 1956, 1957, 1959, 1962, 1964, Keyser and Stoob 1971, 1974, Baltzarek et al. 1973).
A typical case of non-participation was when a town was governed by a council consisting of
patricians that replaced their members with co-optation. For those villages that were too small to
be included in the Städtebuch I have assumed that the peasant community (Gemeinde) participated
in the governance of their village. This is reasonable because German village communities generally
had a wide-ranging autonomy in organizing village life. They assigned rights and duties to their
members to regulate economic activity through villages by-laws, sanctioned inhabitants and levied
taxes (Volckart 2004a: 22-27). This is why German village communities have been emphasised as
“microscopic democracies” (Scribner 1996: 300), which makes it reasonable to assume that villages
had some sort of participative local government.
Protestant reformation. A dummy that indicates whether the Protestant Reformation has been
introduced in a locality. I have taken as introduction date when the council implements the Refor-
mation. This could also be the appointment of a protestant priest by the council. When no intro-
duction is mentioned, or the source indicates that the Reformation had “no substantial impact”, I
count the locality as remaining Catholic. Information was taken from the Städtebuch (Keyser 1939,
1941, 1952, 1954, 1956, 1957, 1959, 1962, 1964, Keyser and Stoob 1971, 1974, Baltzarek et al. 1973).
For villages it was decisive whether the Imperial Estate introduced the Protestant Reformation.
This information has been taken from the Städtebuch and the Historisches Lexikon der deutschen
Länder (Köbler 2007).
Log-university distance. Distance (km) of a locality to the closest University in every given year.
Locations and opening years of German universities are taken from Schilling (1994: 330).
Log-imperial tax. Amount of taxes (Gulden equivalent of so-called “Roman months”) that the
imperial estate to which a locality belonged paid to the Empire in the previous quarter decade.
Information about a locality’s imperial estate has been obtained from the Städtebuch (Keyser 1939,
1941, 1952, 1954, 1956, 1957, 1959, 1962, 1964, Keyser and Stoob 1971, 1974, Baltzarek et al. 1973)
and the Historisches Lexikon der deutschen Länder (Köbler 2007). Information about imperial
taxation was taken from Wilson (2009: 404, 449-453) Wilson (2009, pp. 404, 449–453). Zeumer
(1913) indicates the tax quota of every imperial estate in 1521. I have assumed that this quota
remained constant over time (see Huning and Wahl 2018). The tax amount has been obtained by
multiplying the share of each imperial estate with the total amount of imperial taxation.
Agricultural potential. Index of agricultural potential of a locality. Data was taken from Ra-
mankutty et al. (2002). The index is a composite indicator that takes into account soil quality and
climatic conditions.
Log-river distance. Distance (km) of a locality to the closest major river (Danube, Elbe, Oder and
Rhine). The shapefile of major river locations is provided by the European Environment Agency
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and can be downloaded here https : //www.eea.europa.eu/data−and−maps/data/wise− large−
rivers− and− large− lakes (last accessed April, 17th 2020).
Seaside locality. A dummy that indicates localities that lie within 10 kilometers of the seaside. This
applies to three places in the dataset: Kiel, Rostock and Lübeck.
Imperial city. A dummy that indicates whether a locality was an imperial city. This information
has been obtained from the Städtebuch (Keyser 1939, 1941, 1952, 1954, 1956, 1957, 1959, 1962,
1964, Keyser and Stoob 1971, 1974, Baltzarek et al. 1973). Information about the imperial rank
of each imperial estate (i.e. elector, bishop, imperial city etc.) have been obtained from Zeumer
(1913).
Military construction. Variable that indicates incidents of military construction in the previous
period have been counted. Information has been taken from the Städtebuch. For classifying military
construction (e.g. barracks, arsenals, “gunmen clubhouse” (Schützenhaus) I have followed the
classification scheme of Cantoni et al. (2018).
Schmalkaldic League. Dummy variable that indicates localities that were part of the Schmalkaldic
League in 1546, the year of the beginning of the Schmalkaldic War. The beginning of the war in
1546 has been chosen as cut-off year for the membership of the Schmalkaldic League because the
league was officially dissolved in 1547 at the end of the war. For an on-line list of the members of
the Schmalkaldic League and the years when they joined see:
https : de.wikipedia.org/wiki/SchmalkaldischerBund (last accessed April, 17th 2020).
C Spatial Dependence
Table 12 shows the main baseline specifications when standard errors are adjusted for spatial
autocorrelation following Conley (1999; see also Gibbons et al. 2015: 137). I calculate spatial
correlation-adjusted standard errors following the routine of Fetzer (2014), who builds on Hsiang
(2010). I assume that spatial autocorrelation linearly decreases with distance between localities.
Standard errors have been adjusted for different cutoff-distances until which spatial correlation
decreases to zero, from 50 to 1000 kilometres.
Columns 1 to 4 show the results of the baseline specification (see Column 1 of Table 4 in the main
text) for the period 1400 to 1600 and 1675 to 1800. The estimates of the main variable of interest
remain unchanged and significance remains very high, regardless of the cutoff distance. In Columns
5 and 6 I estimate the baseline specification for the whole period 1400 to 1800 (see Table 4 Column
10 above). Again, the estimates of the main variable of interest remain completely unchanged, and
are significant at high levels. These results suggests that the baseline results are robust to adjusting
standard errors to allow for spatial autocorrelation and that spatial dependence is not a problem
for this study.
However, one might still wonder whether there is actually spatial autocorrelation among localities,
which could then lead to inflated t-statistics. For addressing this potential concern, Moran’s I has
been calculated to evaluate whether there is spatial autocorrelation in the regression residuals. This
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Table 12: Spatial autocorrelation-adjusted std. errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini
1400-1600 & 1675-1800 1400-1800
50km 150km 500km 1000km 500km 1000km
Conflict exposure 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.015** 0.015**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Locality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 380 380 380 380 436 436
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.008 0.008
Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Standard errors clustered at locality level in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
has been done for the respective cross-sections of the dataset (see Kelly 2019: 16-17, 27).
Table 13: Spatial dependence in regression residuals (Global Morans’I-statistic)
(1) (2) (3)
Year I-statistic Z-score P-value
1400 -0.100 0.616 0.269
1425 -0.267 -0.699 0.242
1450 -0.276 -1.156 0.124
1475 -0.219 -1.631 0.051
1500 -0.184 -1.971 0.024
1525 -0.134 -1.366 0.086
1550 0.009 0.445 0.328
1575 -0.047 -0.555 0.289
1600 -0.100 -1.354 0.088
1625 -0.070 -0.339 0.367
1650 -0.194 -1.611 0.054
1675 -0.319 -2.044 0.020
1700 -0.369 -2.556 0.005
1725 -0.385 -2.623 0.004
1750 -0.290 -1.714 0.043
1775 -0.477 -2.987 0.001
1800 -0.333 -1.682 0.046
The specification includes all controls, as in Table 6, but without locality- and time fixed effects
due to the cross-sectional data structure. Kelly (2019: 17, 22) considers positive z-scores of two
and greater as indicative of relevant spatial autocorrelation. Table 13 shows that the z-score for
all years of the analysis is considerably below the critical value of two. This indicates that positive
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spatial autocorrelation, which is what one would usually be concerned about, is not an issue for
this study. Only in a few years at the end of the study period is there some negative spatial
autocorrelation, that is, a tendency that localities with low and high values cluster. However, the
degree of negative spatial-autocorrelation is quite low and is present only in four period. Spatial
dependence, therefore, seems to be a negligible concern. Moreover, note that more sophisticated
methods of dealing with spatial dependence are not feasible here because of the highly unbalanced
structure of the panel. For example, because a spatial weighting matrix can not be calculated with
the available data, estimating a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model (Gibbons et al. 2015: 128) is
impossible.
D Additional Regression Results
Table 14 reports complete regression results of the baseline specification from the main text, in-
cluding demographic, institutional and geographic controls.
Table 14: Complete regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini
1400-1600 & 1675-1800
Conflict exposure 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.017* 0.017** 0.017*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Log-population size 0.034* 0.033* 0.037
(0.019) (0.020) (0.025)
Epidemic -0.012 -0.014 -0.016
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Participative government -0.002 -0.006 -0.017
(0.018) (0.020) (0.023)
Protestant reformation 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
Log-university distance -0.007 -0.006 0.018
(0.007) (0.007) (0.019)
Log-imperial tax -0.020** -0.022** -0.020
(0.008) (0.010) (0.017)
1400×agricultural potential 0.242 0.259
(0.214) (0.249)
1425×agricultural potential 0.209 0.248
(0.197) (0.226)
1450×agricultural potential 0.366* 0.420*
(0.215) (0.226)
1475×agricultural potential 0.044 0.089
(0.080) (0.110)
1500×agricultural potential -0.025 -0.004
(0.082) (0.113)
1525×agricultural potential 0.012 0.043
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(0.101) (0.115)
1550×agricultural potential 0.106 0.119
(0.076) (0.098)
1575×agricultural potential 0.063 0.084
(0.089) (0.113)
1600×agricultural potential 0.106 0.122
(0.090) (0.118)
1675×agricultural potential 0.062 0.061
(0.083) (0.095)
1700×agricultural potential 0.048 0.052
(0.075) (0.088)
1725×agricultural potential 0.000 -0.005
(0.095) (0.108)
1750×agricultural potential 0.031 0.017
(0.077) (0.086)
1775×agricultural potential -0.050 -0.044
(0.073) (0.068)
1400×Log-river distance 0.004 0.008
(0.034) (0.037)
1425×log-river distance 0.014 0.024**
(0.010) (0.011)
1450×log-river distance -0.008 0.001
(0.010) (0.011)
1475×log-river distance -0.000 0.008
(0.009) (0.011)
1500×log-river distance 0.016 0.023**
(0.010) (0.011)
1525×log-river distance 0.016 0.019*
(0.010) (0.010)
1550×log-river distance 0.013 0.015
(0.011) (0.012)
1575×log-river distance 0.014 0.015
(0.011) (0.012)
1600×log-river distance 0.024** 0.026**
(0.011) (0.011)
1675×log-river distance 0.005 0.009
(0.010) (0.011)
1700×log-river distance 0.015 0.016
(0.018) (0.018)
1725×log-river distance 0.027 0.027
(0.017) (0.017)
1750×log-river distance 0.023 0.023
(0.017) (0.018)
1775×log-river distance 0.012 0.011
(0.016) (0.015)
1400×seaside locality -0.121** -0.245*
(0.060) (0.126)
1425×seaside locality -0.124*** -0.138**
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(0.044) (0.059)
1450×seaside locality -0.009 -0.016
(0.067) (0.073)
1475×seaside locality -0.062** -0.087*
(0.031) (0.048)
1500×seaside locality -0.072** -0.096**
(0.030) (0.045)
1525×seaside locality -0.047** -0.046
(0.023) (0.037)
1550×seaside locality -0.051** -0.061*
(0.025) (0.033)
1575×seaside locality -0.071*** -0.064**
(0.026) (0.031)
1675×seaside locality -0.112*** -0.108***
(0.024) (0.024)
1700×seaside locality 0.113*** 0.122***
(0.018) (0.016)
1725×seaside locality 0.095*** 0.098***
(0.018) (0.019)
1750×seaside locality 0.141*** 0.140***
(0.014) (0.014)
Locality FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 380 380 380 380 380
Adjusted R2 0.378 0.361 0.429 0.377 0.442
Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Standard errors clustered at locality level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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Keyser, E. (1956). Deutsches Städtebuch, Bd. 3.3 Landschaftsverband Rheinland. Stuttgart:
Kohlhammer.
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